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Abstract 
 
Online social networking has become one of the most popular activities on the 
internet. Over the years, all these online activities have accumulated a tremendous 
amount of data. The usefulness of these data for new knowledge discoveries has attracted 
many parties demanding it for analysis purposes. Social network data has been used for 
behavioral pattern analysis, finding new customers, targeting products to existing ones 
etc. by business such as finance companies, governments and other interested third party 
entities. Privacy is an important issue when one wants to make use of data that involves 
individuals’ sensitive information, especially in a time when data collection is becoming 
easier and sophisticated data mining techniques are becoming more efficient. Since social 
network data contains sensitive information about the users, publishing social network 
data in raw form raises serious privacy concerns. Therefore, as the need for social 
network data publishing continues to increase, privacy-preserving data publishing 
mechanism that enable the publication of useful information while protecting user 
privacy has become an important and challenging problem. A common privacy 
preserving social network graph approach is through anonymization of the social network 
structure. The problem with altering the structure of the links relationship in social 
network graph is how to balance between the gain of privacy and the loss of information 
(data utility). 
This thesis addresses three key issues in privacy-preserving social network graph 
publishing: (i) how to protect vertex re-identification attack problem; (ii) how to improve 
privacy in social graph anonymization; and (iii) how to preserve utility in social graph 
anonymization. The thesis makes the following significant contributions. First, a novel 
privacy social data attack model to breach a privacy of social network users in an 
anonymized social graph is proposed. The attack model uses broader level of structural 
information than the existing approaches. Using the developed attack approach, it is 
shown that an adversary can easily perpetrate the attack on a degree-based and a 
neighbourhood-based anonymized social graph. The second contribution of the thesis is 
that a technique that improves practicality of manipulating complex structural 
information in vertex re-identification attack is developed. The third contribution of the 
thesis is a new metrics to quantify utility loss in order to achieve better trade-offs 
between privacy and utility. The fourth contribution of the thesis is a new social graph 
anonymization approach that guarantees higher privacy protection with high utility 
preservation. Last but not least, the proposed approaches have been evaluated using both 
real-life and synthetic social network data to validate their effectiveness. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction                          
Online social network has attracted hundreds of millions of users from every 
corner of the world and has become the most popular activities on the net [1, 2]. Using 
various available social media applications, people can simply keep in touch with 
relatives and friends, and share information about their lives, works or anything. Not only 
individual, social media usage by business entities is also a major growth area. Business 
entities and news agencies are now bringing their content materials to targeted audiences 
more effectively. Over the years, all these online activities has accumulated wealth 
amount of data consist of personal information ranging from names to address, education 
to employment, as well as activity data and logs like location, shopping habit, music taste 
and many more. This vast amount of data is collected and maintained by the social media 
service providers. 
The data generated by these online activities opens more opportunities for new 
knowledge discoveries. The availability of large scale social graphs from online social 
networks offers interesting problems to data mining and information extraction. The data 
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also contains implicit information that benefits various domains, e.g., marketing, social 
psychology, and homeland security. For example, business companies are analyzing the 
social connections in social network data to uncover customer relationship that can 
benefit their services, product sales and advertisements. Researchers in sociology, 
epidemiology, and health-care related field value the data about geographic, friendship, 
family, and sexual networks to study disease propagation and risk. There is also increased 
interest by researchers in governments institution in mining social network data for 
gathering behavioral information for security purposes [3].  
Publication of social network data is important in order to allow analysis. In a 
situation, the service providers who maintain the data may has specific interest in specific 
analysis outcomes of their data but due to the lack of in-house expertise to conduct the 
analysis, outsourcing the task to external parties often comes as the alternative option. In 
different situation, the owner of the data shares the data to third parties as a support over 
the demand. However, person-specific data often contains sensitive information whereby 
releasing raw data publicly may violates individual privacy [4-6]. Data publishing 
agencies, such as healthcare providers and public services, face fundamental challenges 
in how to release data to the public without violating the confidentiality of personal 
information. Policies, guidelines and agreements on the publication, use and storage of 
sensitive data cannot guarantee that sensitive data will not be carelessly misplaced.  
1.2 Research Significance 
Publishing the social network data in its original form may violate individual 
privacy. There are well-known examples of unintended disclosure of private information 
in data publishing, causing organizations to become increasingly conservative in 
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releasing these data sets, such as the AOL search data example [7] and attacks on Netflix 
data [8]. In other case, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has published a large 
corpus consisting around 500,000 email messages derived from Enron Corporation 
following its bankruptcy. The corpus has been used by researchers to study the email 
correspondence, organizational structure as well as performing social network analysis. It 
has likely resulted in substantial privacy violations for individuals involved. Therefore, 
releasing the data to third parties has to be done in a way that can guarantee the privacy 
of the users. In other word, the data must undergo a privacy-preserving phase before it is 
released to other parties. 
This problem has recently received considerable traction as more and more social 
network data has been released publicly to enable social network data analysis 
[9],[10],[11],[12]. The traditional approach of publishing the micro data without violating 
individuals’ privacy in the data is to de-identify records by removing the identifying 
attributes such as name and social security number. Several important models have been 
proposed such as k-anonymity [13], l-diversity [14], t-closeness [15], P-sensitive k-
anonymity [16], m-invariance [17], privacy skyline [18] and etc. However, ensuring 
privacy for social network data provides much more challenging than the micro data due 
to the diversity and complexity of graph network data itself. These models proposed for 
micro data cannot straightforwardly to be applied in social network data due to the 
relationship dependency among person in social graph. In social graph, the impact of a 
small modification of link relationship can affect the whole graph network. It is urgently 
importance to develop methods and tools for publishing social network data, so that the 
individual privacy is preserved and published data remains practically useful. 
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1.3 Research Problems 
Privacy in online social networks data have just been raised in recent years [4, 5]. 
Thus, the research in this area is still in its infancy. In general, this research focuses on 
studying a practically efficient privacy-preserving approach that enables publishing of 
social-networking data with measureable privacy guarantee and permits useful analysis 
and result. Particularly, this thesis addresses the following issues:   
a. Practical background knowledge for vertex re-identification attack - Vertex re-
identification attack aims to link specific vertex in social network data to specific 
individual in real world. The goal is to access private/sensitive information like 
sensitive attributes or relationships of the targeted individual in order to breach 
privacy. Even when a released network hides the identity of the users by 
removing names and other identifiable attributes, re-identification attack is still 
possible by manipulating abstract information. This thesis shows that how an 
anonymized social graph still at risk of this attack when the adversary use broader 
level of structural information and how practical is the information to be 
manipulated to re-identify targeted victim in real situation. 
b. How to improve privacy in social graph anonymization? - A social graph can 
have various structural dimensions that exposed for manipulation. Thus, 
preventing social link structure from being manipulated for vertex re-
identification is very challenging [19]. An anonymized social network data that is 
resilient to certain type of re-identification attack may still leave rooms for re-
identification attack that manipulates different structural topologies. It is also 
possible that a combination of a simply-acquired structural property of several 
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individuals could give stronger descriptive power than single structural property. 
Therefore, those issues need to be addressed. 
c. How to control utility loss in social graph anonymization? - Social graph 
anonymization involves modification of the graph. It is very challenging to 
maintain high utility of the data when modifying the link structure in social graph. 
The task has not been mainly regarded in many of previous works. A common 
approach used to preserve utility in structural-based anonymization is by 
controlling the amount of changes made to the social graph believing that the 
fewer the changes made to the graph, the smaller the effects on the utility [1-5]. 
However, an approach that able to quantify the impacts on the graph properties is 
needed. 
1.4 Research Objective 
We list the objective of this research as follows: 
a. To investigate how existing privacy preserving models protect the identity 
from several different re-identification attacks.  
b. To identify new background knowledge that can be used by adversaries to 
launch vertex re-identification attack. 
c. To propose a new approach to anonymize social graph that guarantees higher 
privacy protection. 
d. To propose new measurement to quantify utility loss in order to achieve better 
tradeoffs between privacy and utility.  
e. To evaluate the proposed methods using both real-life and synthetic social 
network data, and to compare them with the existing approaches. 
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1.5 Research Contribution 
We detail the thesis contributions as the following: 
x Privacy Preserving Taxonomy. This thesis presents taxonomy of social media 
applications and services. It investigates the privacy implication and extensive 
reviews of related works on privacy preservation, their concepts, and identifies 
the key components in existing works. The presented taxonomy is mapped to 
current state of the art and assists to perform a gap analysis in this research field. 
x Vertex re-identification attack. This thesis identified new practical background 
knowledge that has significantly increased the risk of users being re-identified in 
social network data. We showed that the re-identification is still possible on 
anonymized data. The thesis also identified a method to simplify the structural 
information into a new practical form to facilitate re-identification attack.  
x ܭ-anonymization. This thesis introduced a new approach to anonymize the social 
graph. The proposed approach leverages broader structural information so that it 
is resilience to multiple type of vertex re-identification attack. 
x Utility preservation. This thesis introduced new metric to control utility loss in 
social graph anonymization. This metric leverages the relationship importance 
between vertices so that the impact of social graph properties is considered to be 
used side-by-side with the number of changes metric. 
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1.6 Methodology 
The proposed work will be carried out based on the experimental computer 
science method. This method examines the research work to demonstrate two important 
concepts: proof-of-concept and proof-of-performance.  
To demonstrate the proof-of-concept, some important steps were performed. First, 
the research area within privacy-preserving of social network data is critically reviewed 
to provide the overview that leads to the formulation of valid problem statements. From 
this review, the research works are justified.  
Proof-of-performance is demonstrated by conducting the implementation for the 
proposed approach. In those simulations, several parameters and workloads were used to 
examine and demonstrate the viability of the proposed solutions compared to the similar 
baseline solutions. Also, analytical analysis of some proposed algorithms is performed to 
evaluate the correctness. 
1.7 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the document is structured as follows:  
x Chapter 2: Literature Reviews. This chapter gives the high-level architecture of 
social network and discuss about the various form of social media and its data 
representation. We also discuss the threat model, the privacy breach categories, 
the background knowledge and data mapping mechanism. We then review the 
existing anonymization techniques for privacy-preserving of social network data. 
This chapter yields the following publications: 
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o Ninggal, M. I. H., & Abawajy, J. (2011). Privacy Threat Analysis of 
Social Network Data. In Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel 
Processing (pp. 165-174). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
o Ninggal, M. I., & Abawajy, J. (2011, November). Attack vector analysis 
and privacy-preserving social network data publishing. In Trust, Security 
and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 2011 IEEE 
10th International Conference on (pp. 847-852). IEEE. 
x Chapter 3: Framework. This chapter dedicates for definitions, data model, dataset 
and implementation settings and evaluation measurement that will be used in all 
parts of the thesis.  
x In Chapter 4: Vertex Re-identification Attack using Neighbourhood-Pair 
Properties. In this chapter we present the vertex re-identification attack where we 
identified new properties that could be used for vertex re-identification and 
increases the risk of users being re-identified in social network data. We also 
identified a technique to transform the properties into coefficient in order to 
increase practicality of the attack. This chapter is yields the following 
publications: 
o Ninggal, M. I. H., & Abawajy, J. H. (2014). Neighbourhood-Pair Attack 
in Social Network Data Publishing. In Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: 
Computing, Networking, and Services (pp. 726-731). Springer 
International Publishing. 
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x Chapter 5: Anonymizing Social Graph by Neighbourhood-pair. This chapter 
presents the mechanism to anonymize social graph in order to protect from the 
attack introduced in Chapter 3.  
x Chapter 6: Preserving Relationship Integrity in Social Graph Anonymization. This 
chapter presents a new metric to measure utility impact in social graph 
anonymization. This chapter is derived from the following publications: 
o Hafez Ninggal, M. I., & Abawajy, J. H. (2013, July). Preserving Utility in 
Social Network Graph Anonymization. In Trust, Security and Privacy in 
Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 2013 12th IEEE 
International Conference on (pp. 226-232). 
o Ninggal, M. I. H., & Abawajy, J. H. (2015). Utility-Aware Social Network 
Graph Anonymization. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 
doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2015.05.013. 
x Chapter 7: Conclusion. This chapter concludes and summarizes the thesis and 
highlights future directions of the research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Reviews 
Online social networks has become a predominant service on the web and served 
in various forms. It is drastically revolutionizing the way people interact. The implicit 
information in the social network data offers interesting problems to data mining and 
information extraction. Therefore, publishing of the data is essential. This chapter 
provides comprehensive review of social network data publishing and its privacy 
concern. It serves the purpose to understand the current demands of privacy protection in 
the field. This chapter also include in-depth analysis on existing commitments to ensure 
privacy in publishing social network data publishing. The literature can be used by 
researchers to understand the background of preserving privacy in social network data, 
the challenges and expectation in the future. 
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2.1 Social Network Data Publishing 
 The social network data publishing components is shown in Fig. 2.1. In the 
architecture, there are users, social media applications, service provider, social network 
data and third party data recipients. The users use the social media services to connect 
and interact with other users. The social media service provider maintains the data of all 
users. The service provider may also release the data to third parties for research and 
analysis. We will describe the component in detail in next section. 
 
 
Social media
users
Online social media
applications
Third-party data
recipients
Social Network
Data
Service
Providers
use operate
maintain
/ own
keep
information
release
data
 
Fig. 2.1 High level system component of social network. 
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2.1.1 Social Media Users 
 Social media users can be any real world entity that uses the service like 
individual or organization. When a user uses an online social media service, they usually 
are asked to create a profile to present themselves and other information about 
themselves. This information includes personal identifiable information like social 
security number, name and phone number which uniquely identify a person. They may 
also give semi-identifiable information like home address, former school he/she went or 
former company he/she has worked as well as private or sensitive information that users 
may like to make available to selected entity while keep it hidden from the public view. 
Sensitive information can include religion, political view, type of disease (as in 
healthcare network) or generated income (as in financial network). On top of that, there 
are also data generated from the social activities from the services. Some of this data may 
also carry sensitive information like location, shopping habit as well as the mind-set of 
the user. 
2.1.2 Online Social Media Applications 
 Online social media applications allow one person to meet up with other people 
on the internet. People use social networking sites for finding old friends, meeting new 
friends, or finding people who have the same interests or problem across political, 
economic, and geographic borders. Online social media applications are provided in 
various forms. Generally, there are six different forms of social media [20]: collaborative 
projects, blogs, content communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds, and 
virtual communities.  Fig. 2.2 shows the taxonomy of social media services. 
13 
 
Collaborative projects
Blogs
Content Communities
Social Networking Sites
Virtual Game
Virtual Communities
Online social media
 
Fig. 2.2 Taxonomy of social media. 
  
Collaborative projects allow many users to collaborate in creating contents. The 
motivation behind collaborative projects is that the joint effort of many users’ increase 
the potential to a better outcome compared to the outcome achieved individually. 
Exemplary applications within this type include the online encyclopedia, Wikipedia 
(wikipedia.com) and Google Document (docs.google.com). Wikipedia can be edited by 
anyone with access to the site while the collaboration in Google Docs usually is based on 
invitation.  
 Another form, Blogs, is a website that usually display the contents in 
chronological order based on the content entry date. They may appear in many variations, 
from personal diaries describing the author's life to idea expression on various issues to 
reviews or summaries of all relevant information in specific product or field. The 
example of popular application for this category is LiveJournal (livejournal.com) and 
Blogger (blogger.com). User of this application normally has a profile page, which 
contains contact information, a biography, images, interests, communities and even 
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schools which the user has attended in the past or is currently attending. Users also have a 
friend list that allows them to alert the most recent journal entries of the people on his/her 
friends list. Social interaction is performed by leaving comment to other users’ entries.  
 Content communities enable the sharing of media contents between participants. 
Content communities comes in a multitude of different media types, including videos 
(e.g., YouTube.com), photos (e.g., Flickr.com), text (e.g., BookCrossing.com, via which 
750,000+ people from over 130 countries share books), and PowerPoint presentations 
(e.g., Slideshare.net). In this form, users also have a “User Info" page, which contains a 
variety of data. Apart from sharing content, users perform social interaction by leaving 
comments and give rating to other users’ contents. Each user also has a friend list to 
collect the most recent media entries from their friends. 
 The Social networking sites, the most popular form of social media are 
applications that enable participants to connect by creating personal information profiles, 
inviting friends and colleagues to have access to those profiles, and sending e-mails and 
instant messages between each other. These personal profiles can include any type of 
information, including photos, video, audio files, and blogs. Indeed, this form mixes 
several social media types into one package. Facebook (facebook.com) is the most 
popular application of this kind where it currently has more than 500 million active users 
and they spend over 700 billion minutes per month of using the application [8].  
 Virtual worlds are platforms that replicate a three-dimensional environment in 
which users can appear in the form of personalized avatars and interact with each other as 
they would in real life. Virtual world can have two forms; Virtual game and Virtual 
social world. In Virtual game, users are required to behave according to strict rules in the 
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context of a massively multiplayer online role-playing game. An example of virtual game 
worlds is World of Warcraft (us.battle.net) which counts around 8.5 million subscribers 
[20]. The second group of virtual worlds, often referred to as Virtual Social Worlds, 
allows inhabitants to choose their behavior more freely and essentially live a virtual life 
similar to their real life. There are no rules restricting the range of possible interactions. A 
popular example of this social media form is Second Life (secondlife.com). 
2.1.3 Service Provider 
 Service providers are the party that develops and operates online social media 
applications. In most cases, the goal for providing social media services is for business 
purposes. In online social media business model, users are defined as supplier, product 
and a commodity at the same time. Users supply the data, that later to be sold for 
marketing revenue of the provider. Revenue is typically gained via advertisements, and 
also subscription.  
2.1.4 Social Network Data 
 Social network data can be modeled as social graph that contains vertices and 
connections between them (refer Fig. 2.3). The vertices are the social actors that usually 
represent real world individuals or organizations and edges represent relationships among 
individuals. Besides vertices and edges, additional information about individuals and 
relationships can be represented by labels. For example, vertex labels usually contain 
personal information, such as name, gender, birth date, salary, education, location 
political view, religion etc. On the other hand, edge label can represent information about 
relationships, such as types of relationships, e.g., friendship, kinship, and co-authorship, 
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and weights of relationships, e.g. trustworthiness, frequency of instant messaging or 
email communications. 
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Fig. 2.3 Graphical social network data representation. 
 
2.1.5 Third-party Data Recipients 
 Social network has long been studied in various area of research. The information 
underlying the social network data have been beneficial to various application domains 
such as sociology [21], psychology [22], epidemiology [23], biology [24] and 
criminology [25]. However, researches in the past were restricted by the small scale of 
social graphs. The availability of large scale social graphs from online social networks 
has driven new researches and business applications, e.g. viral advertising, social 
networks evolution, and so on. Advertising partners tend to be interested in the 
connections pattern in social networks. It can serve as a customer relationship 
management tool for companies selling products and services and to enable better social 
targeting of advertisements. A social graph can also represent data from offline network 
sources of personal information, such as hospitals, telephone companies, law 
enforcement and other government agencies. In other situation, social network service 
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providers who maintain the data may has specific interest in specific analysis outcomes 
of their data but due to the lack of in-house expertise to conduct the analysis, outsourcing 
the task to external parties often comes as the alternative option. Thus, the publication of 
social network data is important.  
2.2 Privacy Implication  
 In general, individual privacy is the ability of individuals to reveal anything about 
them selectively. It is the right to choose what information to represent themselves and 
what to hide. Social media service providers are responsible for abiding the regulations 
about privacy protection. In most social media applications, service providers have 
established certain privacy policies and provided mechanisms for members to control the 
visibility of their sensitive personal information. A piece of personal information can be 
designated sensitive by the individuals or by the system policy. In general, whether a 
piece of information is sensitive can vary from person to person. For example, a member 
can designate certain information they provide as sensitive, and set privacy options to 
make it viewable only to selected users. 
 Privacy implications associated with online social networking depend on the level 
of identifiability of the information provided, its possible recipients, and its possible uses 
[26]. In health care area, Personal Health Record (PHR) systems such as Google Health 
(health.google.com), Microsoft HealthVault (www.healthvault.com) and Dossia 
(www.dossia.org) allows users to store and manage personal information, including 
health information, emergency contacts, insurance plans, medications, immunizations, 
past procedures, test results, medical conditions, allergies, medications, family histories 
and lab results. Sharing of this information across user accounts is also supported. Users 
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also can invite professionals, family members or third parties to access a portion of their 
health record. The service also allows users to purchase consultation or monitoring 
services from registered health care providers. There are several risks that accompany 
online methods of care delivery because health information is perhaps the most valuable 
and closely guarded information pertaining to individuals. Indeed, placing detailed 
histories of health information online could expose users to significant risks [27]. The 
unauthorized disclosure of this type of data can result in serious consequences for an 
individual, ranging from social embarrassment and dissolution of relationships to the 
termination of insurance and employment contracts. 
 Social finance network services like Wikinvest (www.wikinvest.com), Zopa 
(www.zopa.com) and linkedFA (www.linkedFA.com) is also changing the way finance 
has been done. The service provides financial advisors, registered investment advisors, 
insurance advisors as well as loan. Users create profiles to interact and display 
information to clients, peers and recruiters enabling them to present a professional image 
and demonstrate their business integrity to enhance investor confidence. New user can 
connect with successful business people to learn about finance and economics. Some 
services like Covester (www.covester.com) allow real trading activities viewable in 
public. Member can watch investment habits of other members in order to learn how to 
invest their money. On the other hand, individuals or organizations which are looking for 
loan can use social media service like Prosper (www.prosper.com) to create a listing like 
eBay. Lenders member will then participate in an auction to fund the loan. All in all 
wherever money is involves, unacceptable disclosure of this type of data can also result 
in serious consequences for individual ranging from scam and frauds to physical threats. 
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 Other implications also could possibly happen like digital dossier, if the 
adversaries happen to gather too much personal information from combined sources, the 
result on privacy threat can be very significant. For example the threats can be physical 
security aspect like stalking, blackmailing and robbery. Besides that the leakage of 
harmful contents may also leads to severe damage to the individual’s image and 
reputation. Intellectual property theft could also possible to result when information 
related to intellectual property may be leaked to third party risking losing the copyright. 
Other than personal information, corporate information disclosure can resulted in 
corporate secrets theft if the adversary obtains private and sensitive data regarding the 
organization.  
2.3 Privacy Breach in Published Social Network Data 
 A privacy breach occurs when sensitive information about individuals is disclosed 
to adversaries. The privacy breaches in social networks can be categories into three types; 
identity disclosure, sensitive link disclosure, and sensitive attribute disclosure [28, 29]. 
2.3.1 Identity Disclosure 
 In identity disclosure, the specific individual identity behind a record is revealed. 
Identity disclosure happens when an adversary is able to map a record to specific 
individual. The identity disclosure may be considered as the key of privacy violation in 
social networks because it usually leads to the disclosure of content information as well 
as the information about relationship they have got. It could also lead to the revelation of 
an individual’s existence in a closed community network where he/she has strong privacy 
expectation of their existence in that group. For example, Facebook allows its user to 
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create a network group with invited only member. This closed community network group 
could theme from secret society to political movement to religious purpose. Therefore, 
revealing someone existence in such group would also violate their privacy. 
2.3.2 Sensitive Link Disclosure 
 Sensitive link disclosure reveals the relationships between two individuals. The 
link among vertices in social network data can be a symbolism of relationship between 
individuals or organizations. This information is generated from social activities when 
using social media services. There are relationships that are safe for public to know, but 
some individuals may not prepare to reveal specific relationship they have. An adversary 
may want to know the degree of relationship between two entities. The disclosure occurs 
when the adversary is able to find out the existence of a relationship between two users, 
which the involved individuals prefer to keep it private. For examples, a person chooses 
not to reveal their political affiliation in a social network application. However, in the 
released social network data, it is found that he is linked to few groups of specific 
political movement. Then it may be possible to infer the political affiliation of the person 
in question. 
2.3.3 Sensitive Attribute Disclosure 
 For sensitive attribute disclosure, the sensitive data associated with each vertex or 
edge is compromised. Attribute disclosure occurs when an adversary is able to determine 
the value of a sensitive user attribute, which the user intended to keep it as private. 
Sensitive attributes may be associated with an entity as well as link relationship. In 
application level, the visibility of the attribute information is often variable. A member's 
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profile can be set to be viewed publicly as well as by limited people in the  network. In 
social network sites, content which commonly viewable by public usually something 
about hobbies and interests. However, certain application requires the user to give 
specific information accordingly to the application theme. In health based application, 
there could be information such as drinking and drug habits or type of disease that the 
user gives in the profile for monitoring purpose by other user in the system such as 
doctor. On the other hand, in online sexual network, there are sexual- based 
information like preferences and orientation. Meanwhile, there is also sensitive 
information generated from the interaction between users. For example in messaging 
network and email, the sensitive content are usually the text message, the timestamp, the 
frequency of interaction and other information correspond to both parties. Users usually 
have strong perception that this information is kept private [13]. 
2.4 Vertex Re-identification Attack 
 In published social graph, sensitive information is usually associated with vertices 
and edges with no identities. In vertex re-identification attack, an adversary attempt to 
link specific vertex in the data to specific real world individual. Once the specific vertex 
and real world identity is linked, all the sensitive information about him/her like sensitive 
attributes or sensitive links are considered disclosed, hence, the privacy is breached.  
2.4.1 Vertex Query 
 To query the victim in the published social network data, adversaries normally 
use some parameters known as background knowledge. Background knowledge is a piece 
of information that is known to the adversary and used by the adversary to re-identify 
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individual and intrude user privacy [30]. In social network data, the background 
knowledge that could potentially be used to re-identify individual is the personal attribute 
information and structural (or topological) attribute information.  
2.4.1.1 Attribute-based Query 
 The personal attribute is the information that describes a person such as name, 
address, date of birth, political view etc. Some attributes acts as an identifier itself and 
unique to individuals. Some are sensitive attributes that consists of sensitive person-
specific information such as political view, income/salary, disease, and other medical 
status. Another attributes are categorized as semi identifiers or quasi attributes. Each of 
quasi attributes does not uniquely identify an individual, but their combination is 
potential to point out unique or a small number of individuals. Therefore, quasi-attribute 
is usually exploited by adversaries to query a targeted victim in social network data. This 
type of query is also known as linking attack. The quasi attributes can be obtained by 
observation. It was not very difficult for an adversary to obtain an individual's gender, zip 
code, and date of birth, which could serve as the quasi-identifier in attribute-based query. 
There have been many researches focus on this type of re-identification attack. In this 
work, we are interested in structural-based re-identification attack. 
2.4.1.2 Structural-based Query 
 Structural queries exploit the structural information of the social network graph 
that serves as the adversary’s background knowledge. The structural information 
describes how an entity is connected to other entities in social network data. The 
adversary could perform structural queries to identify the existence of a specific structural 
pattern around the targeted victim. By these queries, the adversary is assumed to be able 
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to gather some fixed number of social links focused around the target. For example in 
some social network applications, acquiring the number of friends that appear in the user 
profile is easy. This information can be used to locate targeted victim in a published 
social network data. In situation where the data size is small e.g. only involve on a 
specific social group in the network - the query results could be very minimal or possibly 
unique. 
2.4.1.3 Active vs. Passive Attack 
 In passive attack, the adversaries make queries over the released data without 
having the ability to modify the network prior to its release. In the other hand, the 
adversary may properly create a set of dummy profiles and create a pattern of social links 
among these accounts. The adversary then use these dummy accounts/profiles to establish 
a social link to target individual such that they can be uniquely identified in the released 
social network structure. This is called active attack. The social link can be established as 
easy as adding target to the friend list or address book. Another way is the adversary 
simply constructs a coalition with other friends which also forming a small uniquely 
identifiable sub-graph. Having knowledge about specific pattern of relationship that the 
adversary purposely created, he/she later uses that pattern to locate the target individual 
in the released data [5]. 
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2.5 Anonymizing Social Network Data 
 To avoid privacy breach, the most common approach used is to anonymize the 
data prior publishing. In this regard, the released social network data is tampered and 
deviates from the original data set. In this section, we highlight the approaches and 
strategies in anonymizing social network data. 
2.5.1 k-Anonymity 
 The most widely adopted approach in anonymization is k-anonymity principle 
[31]. K-anonymity is originally proposed for databases and the contained tables. Early 
work in privacy dealt with the privacy of statistical tables (databases) using inference 
control [32, 33]. A released data is said to have the k-anonymity property if the 
information for each person contained in the released data is indistinguishable from at 
least k other person whose information also appear in the released data. For social 
network data, the information about person includes the structural information. This 
information tells how the person connects with other person in the network.  To achieve 
k-anonymity, social graph connection is modified so that any vertex in the network is 
structurally indistinguishable with other k vertices, so that vertex re-identification attack 
is not possible.  The modification is done by adding or deleting edge as well as vertices, 
and generalizing the labels of vertices. Only after k-anonymity requirement is fulfilled, 
the data modification process is considered as sufficient. 
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2.5.2 Anonymization Strategies 
 A common way to anonymize a social network data is to modify the network by 
deleting or adding edges and vertices, and generalizing the labels. There are several 
strategies of how to perform the modification on the social network data.  
2.5.2.1 Random Modification 
 In random strategy [34], the social network data is modified by randomly adding, 
deleting or switching edges. In random add/delete approach, it randomly add k fake edges 
followed by deleting k original edges. This strategy preserves the total number of edges 
in the original graph. Random switch, as its name, randomly switch a pair of existing 
edges and repeat this process for k times. This strategy preserves the degree of each 
vertex. The random modification approaches protect the data against re-identification in a 
probabilistic manner. However, they cannot guarantee that the randomized graphs satisfy 
k-anonymity. Privacy should be looked from the perspective of every single user [35]. By 
arbitrary modification, it simply ignores this premise because it implies that it does only 
provide privacy guarantee for random user. On the other hand, this approach has an 
advantage that many features could be accurately reconstructed from the released 
randomized graph [36]. 
2.5.2.2 Clustering-based Modification  
 The clustering-based strategy, the vertices are first partitioned into equivalent 
classes. The goal is to get at least ݇ vertices in every clusters. Edge and vertex addition 
and deletion operation are performed to ensure each class contains vertices and link that 
share similar affinities. This strategy ensures the balance between privacy and utility of 
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the data. However, it is said that different clustering approach gives different quality of 
anonymization [37, 38].  
2.5.2.3 Network Generalization 
 The network generalization strategies shares similar steps as in clustering-based 
modification where the vertices are partitioned into equivalent classes. However, there is 
no restriction on minimum vertices that should be in every equivalent class. Thus, no 
edge and vertex insertion and deletion is performed to ensure each cluster contain at least 
݇ vertex members. Instead, the anonymization is achieved by collapsing all vertices in 
every classes as single super vertices and super edges [34]. 
2.6 Existing k-Anonymization Models 
 In this section, we review the existing privacy-preserving models for social 
network data anonymization that is based on k-anonymity. We first describe about the 
data model that used in previous works. 
2.6.1 Social Graph Model 
 Different models for published social network data have been used in existing 
researches. The following are some of such models: 
x A simple model: In this model, the social network data is denoted by a graphܩ ൌ
ሺܸǡ ܧሻ, where ܸ is a set of vertices or nodes, and ܧ is a set of edges or links. Each 
vertex is an entity that typically corresponds to an individual or a group of 
individuals. An edge represents a relationship between two individuals. 
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x A rich model: In this model, each vertex is attached with attributes or data. Each 
vertex typically is an individual, so each vertex is associated with some personal 
information. The attribute of each edge can be from type of relationship, to the 
content of private communication.  
DEFINITION 2.1: Graph Automorphism. Given a graphܩ ൌ ሺܸǡ ܧሻ, ܩis automorphic if 
for any edge ሺݑǡ ݒሻ א ܧ, there also exist a bijection h for edge ൫݄ሺݑሻǡ ݄ሺݒሻ൯ א ݄ሺܧሻin ܩ. 
DEFINITION 2.2: Graph Isomorphism. Given two graphs ܩ ൌ ሺܸǡ ܧሻandܩᇱ ൌ ሺܸᇱǡ ܧᇱሻ, 
ܩ is isomorphic to ܩᇱ if there exists a bijection݄between ܸ andܸᇱ such that for any 
edgeሺݑǡ ݒሻ א ܸ, there is also a bijective edge൫݄ሺݑሻǡ ݄ሺݒሻ൯ א ܸᇱ. 
2.6.2 Identity Preserving Models 
Identity preserving model concerns with protecting individual identity from being 
re-identified. Formally, the problem can be defined as:  Given a published social network 
data, if an adversary can locate the target victim ݐ as a vertex ݒ from the released social 
network data, then the identity of ݐ is disclosed. 
2.6.2.1 Naive Anonymization 
 Andy 
Bob Gary Eddie 
Claudia 
Davood Farhan 
Harinda 
Izuan 
Jemal 
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Fig. 2.4 Original social graph G (left) and naively-anonymized graph ܩҧ (right). 
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Assume that an adversary wants to locate Gary in the released data. A most 
common and simple way to anonymize the data is by removing the person identifiable 
information such as Name to de-associate the vertices from specific real-world 
individual. This conventional way is known as Naive Anonymization. Fig. 2.4 shows an 
example of naïve anonymization from its original data. For simplicity, the figure only 
consider single person attribute which is Name. On the right graph, the name has been 
replaced with numbers for the purpose of anonymization. The structure of the graph is 
retained unmodified. Using personal attributes to map the vertex of a victim in the social 
network data is similar to finding the tuple of a victim in a published micro data [39, 40]. 
However, even after personal attributes has been anonymized, it is insufficient to ensure 
privacy [5]. The privacy may still be leaked if the adversary knows the structural 
information (refer Fig. 2.5) about the target individual. Several privacy models that focus 
on different graph topological features are found in the literature. 
2.6.2.2 ࢑-Degree 
Liu and Terzi [41] studied the problem of identity re-identification based on 
degree structural characteristic. As an example, given the naïvely anonymized social 
network ܩҧ in Fig. 2.5 which the identity attributes has been removed. If the adversary 
knows that Gary has four degrees (four friends), by using query graph ܳଵ in Fig. 2.5 (a), 
he could still identify Gary as vertex #7 in the naïve-anoymized graph.  
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 Gary  Gary  Gary 
 ܽሻ ͳܳ  b)ܳʹ  c)ܳ͵ 
 
Fig. 2.5 Structural information about Gary. 
To prevent vertex re-identification through vertex degree information, the authors 
proposed the notion of k-degree: for every vertex, there should be other k similar vertices 
that are indistinguishable based on the number of degree. Other works that make use of 
the degree property also appeared in [30]. Fig. 2.6 shows the sample output of degree-
based k-anonymous graph and its query output table. In the table, it is shown that each 
number of degrees is shared by at least two vertices, so the graph achieved 2-anonymity. 
If an adversary tries to identify Gary using ܳଵ query input, he/she will find at least two 
vertices have similar number of degree. These are vertex #1 and #7. Identity re-
identification using degree information is realistic. However, it is not strong enough to 
guarantee privacy. This is true if an adversary knows more detail structural information 
about targeted individual rather than only degree information. 
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Fig. 2.6 Degree-based k-anonymous network derived from G with݇ ൌ ʹ. 
Degree Vertex 
1 - 
2 2, 3, 5, 10 
3 4, 6, 8, 9 
4 1, 7 
a) ܳଵ   b) ܳଶ   c) ܳଷ 
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2.6.2.3 ࢑-Neighbourhood 
Zhou and Pei [19, 42] gives stronger assumption on the adversary's background 
knowledge. They assumed that if an adversary has the knowledge about how the 
neighbourhood vertices of a targeted vertex are connected themselves, then the privacy 
could still be breached. For example, assume the adversary has a priori belief that Gary 
has four degrees as in Fig. 2.5 (a). This assumption is used in [43]. The authors take this 
assumption further that the adversary also learned that three out of four of Gary’s close 
friends know each other as depicted in Fig. 2.5 (b). Then the vertex representing Gary can 
still be re-identified uniquely as vertex #7 since no other vertices have the same structural 
characteristic. To protect from neighbourhood attack, the authors proposed a notion of k-
neighbourhood: if there are at least k other verticesݑଵǡ ǥݑ௞ିଵ א ܸ such that the sub 
graphs constructed by the neighbours of each vertexݑଵǡ ǥݑ௞ିଵ are all isomorphic, the 
graph satisfies k-neighbourhood anonymity. In [42], the author extends their work by 
include the l-diversity problem in social network. L-diversity, which was first introduced 
for tabular data anonymization, considers that within an equivalent group, there must 
have l diverse of sensitive attributes. This work also was expanded by Tripathy and 
Panda [44]. 
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Fig. 2.7 Neighbourhood-based k-anonymous graph derived from ܩ with݇ ൌ ʹ. 
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Fig. 2.7 is an example neighbourhood-based anonymized network graph. Assume 
that the target individual is still Gary and the adversary knows that Gary has four degrees 
and also know that three out of four of Gary’s close friends know each other as denoted 
by ܳଶ in Fig. 2.5 (b). If the adversary tries to identify Gary from k-neighbourhood 
network graph (Fig. 2.7) using ܳଶ in Fig. 2.5 (b), the adversary will get k similar 
neighbourhood with four degree which are vertices ሼ͸ǡ͹ǡͺǡͻǡͳͲሽ and vertices ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡͶǡͷሽǤ 
Therefore, the output graph is anonymized and can guarantee privacy under degree based 
attack and neighbourhood-based attack. 
The solution of ݇-neighbourhood considers only 1-radius of neighbourhood 
relationship. This is due to assumption that it is very hard for the adversaries to gather 
such amount of information [19] because the adversary has limited access to perform 
wider lookup coverage. This is quite true if we assume the adversary collects the 
neighbourhood information from the single targeted vertex. However, there are 
possibilities that the adversary can perform a series of lookups from several other users 
that has link to the targeted victim. Consequently, this will allow the adversary to get 
wider than 1-hop neighbourhood information. As studied in [30, 34], identity re-
identification based on 3-radius neighbourhood has significant rate of success compared 
to 1-radius and 2-radius neighbourhood. On top of that, in the case of active attack, it is 
also possible for adversaries to know larger size of sub graph when the sub graph was 
indeed created by the adversary before the network is released. For example, given the ݇-
neighbourhood anonymized network graph as in Fig 2.8, if the attacker know that query 
ܳଷas in Fig. 2.5 (c) exists around Gary, the adversary still can locate Gary in the network 
since there is only one unique match of ܳଷ in the network. 
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2.6.2.4 ࢏-Hop 
Thompson and Yao [45] introduce the notion of ݅-hop anonymity which focuses 
on the degrees of the immediate neighbours of a vertex. The assumption is that 
information about a vertex may be inferred from information about its immediate 
neighbours. Similar to k-neighbourhood, if information about a vertex and its immediate 
neighbours is known to an adversary, the adversary can then use the information to 
disclose the identity of a given vertex. 
2.6.2.5 ࢑-Automorphism 
Zou et al. [37] proposed the notion of k-automorphism based on the assumption 
that the adversary may learn and know the sub graph around the target entity. If such sub-
graph is distinguishable in the anonymized graph, then the targeted vertex in the sub 
graph still has the risk of identity disclosure. In k-automorphism model, the aim is to 
construct a new graph so that for any sub-graph around a vertex v, there are at least k 
similar sub graphs isomorphic to v. The work, however, does not include personal 
attributes in the anonymization. ܭ-automorphism demonstrated that it cannot be resilient 
to multiple attacks thus it guarantees privacy under any structural attack [37]. Fig. 2.8 
illustrates the output graph of anonymization by ݇-automorphism method from the 
original graphܩ (Fig. 2.4). 
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Fig. 2.8 ݇-Automorphic graph derived from ܩ with݇ ൌ ʹ. 
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2.6.2.6 ࢑-Symetry 
 Wu et al [46] proposed the notion of k-Symmetry which also based on 
automorphism partition that aims for sub graph level anonymity. They use vertices/edges 
addition strategy which they call orbit copying to derive an anonymized graph from the 
original. To evaluate the properties of the network, the authors proposed sampling 
methods to extract approximate versions of the original network from the anonymized 
network. Fig. 2.9 gives an example of graph anonymization based on k-symmetry model 
transformed from the naïve anonymized graph in Fig. 2.4 (b). Using k-automorphism or 
k-symmetry notions as an example, if the adversary tries to locate Gary using a sub graph 
query ܳଷ (Fig. 2.5(c)), the result will give k indistinguishable sub graphs in ܩҧ that match 
his sub graph query. In other words, it is guaranteed that the probability of a successful 
re-identification is no more than 1/k. 
2.6.3 Link Preserving Model 
 The disclosure of link relationship must be bound to identity disclosure. However, 
link disclosure can still occur even if each vertex is k-anonymous [47]. For example, 
assume an adversary wants to know if individual ܣ has relationship with individualܤ. 
Given a released network ܩҧ that satisfies k-anonymity. Thus, the adversary could not find 
individual ܣ and individual ܤ with more than ͳȀ݇ probability. That is because vertices 
with same structural information are grouped in an equivalent class and there are ݇ 
vertices with the same structural information. 
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Fig. 2.9 K-Symmetric anonymous network derived from graph ܩ with ݇ ൌ ʹ. 
 
However, if every possible vertex ݒ א ܸ has an edge ݁ א ܧ with every possible 
vertex of ݑ א ܸ in the same equivalent class, the adversary can assure that individual ܣ 
and individual ܤ is definitely has relationship. Fig. 2.10 illustrates this problem. The 
figure shows an anonymized graph with k-automorphic graph with݇ ൌ Ͷ. The adversary 
happens to have learned sub-graph ܳଵ as the background knowledge for individual ܣ and 
sub-graph ܳଶ as the knowledge for individual B. The k-automorphic graph guarantee that 
using either  ܳଵ or ܳଶ as the query parameter, the adversary is not be able to determine 
which one with probability more thanͳȀͶ. However, all four candidates of query ܳଵ 
have single path connection to the other four candidates of queryܳଶ. If this relationship 
is considered secret, then the privacy has been compromised. This example shows that 
link privacy breaches is still possible even when the k-anonymity is satisfied. 
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Fig. 2.10 k-Anonymous graph and query parameters. 
2.6.3.1 ࢑-Isomorphism 
 Cheng et al. [38] have considered link identification attack and proposed the 
notion of k-isomorphism which relies on the concept of graph isomorphism. They 
showed that by anonymizing k pair-wise sub graphs, identity and link relationship 
protection can be attained. However, discovering of frequent sub-graphs is costly, 
especially when considering large sub-graphs for isomorphism test task. It is said that 
general graph isomorphism problem that determines whether two graphs are isomorphic 
is NP hard [38]. Concern with that, the algorithm proposed in this work introduces 
threshold mechanism as a method for reducing the cost of frequent sub-graphs searching. 
The threshold impose the size of the sub-graphs to be extracted should not bigger than the 
average degree of the whole graph. Greedy algorithm is then used for clustering the sub-
graphs where the most frequent sub-graph and contain vertices with the highest degrees is 
given priority. The argument is that, high degree sub-graphs may incur greater distortion. 
Thus, by treating those sub-graphs earlier promotes better chance to reduce overall 
ࡽ૚ ൌ 
ࡽ૛ ൌ 
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distortion. For the anonymization operation, the authors adopt hashing mechanism to 
avoid a sub-graph is processed repeatedly. The modification is done by edge and vertex 
addition strategy on the remaining sub-graphs that are not belonging to any cluster. The 
algorithm ensures that for any sub-graph query to map target individual, there will be at 
least k indistinguishable sub-graph. Hence identity protection is guaranteed. If the 
adversary aims to attack the linkage of two targeted individuals, in the worst case, the 
adversary can find matching vertices for both individuals in one of the sub-graphs. 
However, by k-isomorphism, the matching is true for k other sub-graphs. Therefore the 
link relationship privacy also holds. This work does not take into account personal 
attribute information during anonymization. Therefore, if there is personal attribute 
information attached to each vertex, then the sub-graphs are still being considered as 
distinguishable. 
2.6.3.2 t-Confidence 
 Zhang and Zhang [48] studied about link identification attack in which the 
adversary attack using linking probability. In their work, the author assumes that after the 
adversary has been able to pinpoint the equivalent class of target individuals in a graph 
partition, the adversary then wants to determine the probability that there is an edge 
linking the two targeted individuals. To protect such attack, the author proposed the 
notion of t-confidence. The graph satisfies t-confidence and provide edge anonymity if 
the ratio of actual edges and possible edges between the equivalent classes is greater than 
a given threshold t. The authors proposed three strategies to anonymize the graph which 
are degree-based edge deletion and edge-based edge swap. In first two algorithms, greedy 
strategy is employed to improve graph confidence based on the maximum linking 
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probability as the factor. It focuses on reducing the size of the leading edge equivalent 
class, which corresponds to the maximum linking probability of the graph. Thus, only 
edge deletion and edge swap are considered. Reducing the size of the leading edge 
equivalent class is claimed to improve graph confidence more quickly. On the choosing 
edge to be deleted of swapped, the largest reduction to the maximum linking probability 
should be met. The third algorithm is an alternative edge deletion method, which chooses 
a random edge, instead of the best edge. However, there is possibility that the graph 
confidence could be achieved immediately. In such situation, only by deleting more 
edges, the graph confidence could be obtained. This could cost more utility. In the 
experiments conducted based on three real-world social networks, it is shown that their 
work can effectively preserve edge anonymity and can produce anonymous graphs of 
acceptable utility. 
2.6.3.3 Noisy Or 
 Zheleva et al. [29] considered a link re-identification attacks in which the 
adversary infers sensitive relationships from non-sensitive ones in graphs that contains 
multiple types of edges. They focus on the data domain where there are multiple types of 
edges but only one type of vertices. The privacy breach is measured by counting the 
number of sensitive edges that can be inferred from the anonymized data. An adversary 
succeeds when she/he can correctly predict the existence of a sensitive edge exists 
between two vertices. Thus, the scenario where each observed edge contributes to the 
probability of the existence of a sensitive edge must be sensed in the first hand. To 
achieve that, the author adopted noisy-or model which influence the observation edge 
with noise parameter. 
38 
 
2.6.3.4 Edge-Randomization 
 In [49], Ying and Wu considers edge re-identification attacks in which the 
adversary does not have any background knowledge. Their methods obtain an 
anonymous graph by randomly adding noise to the data. However, due to the introduction 
of very small random noise, the anonymous graphs obtained by these methods may not 
provide sufficient protection to edge anonymity. The authors also investigated the 
relationship among the prior beliefs, posterior beliefs without exploiting similarity 
measures, and the enhanced posterior beliefs with exploiting similarity measures. They 
observed that for those observed links with high similarity values, the enhanced posterior 
belief is significantly greater than the posterior belief without exploiting similarity 
measures. To anonymize the graph, they randomly adding (deleting or swapping) edges, 
so that the difference between the prior and the posterior probabilities is less than a given 
threshold. The resulting graph preserves the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix 
and the second largest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of the original graph. 
 Variants of k-anonymity based approach for social networks have been proposed 
as privacy protection mechanism. However, most of these approaches provide arbitrary 
assumptions on the information available to the adversary as well as the properties of the 
social network. This implies that those mechanisms might only effective against very 
restricted adversaries. In the other hand, it is likely that the auxiliary information to be 
available to the adversaries is global in nature (e.g., another social network with partially 
overlapping membership) and not restricted to the neighbourhood of a single vertex [50]. 
On top of that, current mechanisms have been evaluated on small, simulated networks 
whose characteristics are different from real social networks. Therefore, they might be 
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unable to capture self-reinforcing, feedback based attacks, in which re-identification of 
some vertices provides the attacker with more auxiliary information, which is then used 
for further re-identification [50].  
2.6.3.5 SangreeA 
 Campan and Truta [51] considered an undirected graph model, in which edges are 
not labeled but vertices are associated with some attributes including identifier, quasi-
identifier, and sensitive attributes. The goal is that any two vertices from any cluster are 
indistinguishable based on either their relationships as well as their attributes. To protect 
privacy, both the quasi-identifier personal attributes and the quasi-identifier structural 
attribute should satisfy k-anonymity. Thus, any two vertices from any cluster are 
indistinguishable based on either their structure or content attributes. They adopt greedy 
approach to optimize utility using the attribute and structural information simultaneously. 
They introduce a structural information loss measure based on probability off error, and 
adopt a generalization based measure to calculate attribute information loss. The 
anonymization algorithm can be adjusted to preserve more of the structural information 
of the network or the vertices’ attribute values. Sample output of graph generalization is 
given in Fig. 2.11. 
3
1
10
9764
8
52
   
Fig. 2.11   a) Vertex partitioning b) Partition generalization 
ܾ݈݋ܿ݇ଵ ܾ݈݋ܿ݇ଶ 
a) b) 
ܾ݈݋ܿ݇ଶ ܾ݈݋ܿ݇ଵ 
|ܥ݈ଵ| |ܥ݈ଶ| 
ܧ௖௟భǡ௖௟మ 
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2.6.3.6 ANÓNIMOS 
Das et al. [52] studied privacy attacks that aim to discover the true weights in 
social links. They proposed edge weight ݇-anonymity which is an anonymization method 
that changes the weights of edges. To satisfy ݇-anonymity property, the weight of each 
edge must be indistinguishable to at least ݇ other edges emanating from the same vertex. 
Their method also preserves a linear property of the original graph. A linear property of a 
graph is a system of linear inequalities involving edge weights as variables. Intuitively, a 
linear property models the execution of some graph algorithms, such as Kruskal’s 
minimum spanning tree and Dijkstra’s shortest path. Thus, the preserving of linear 
property in anonymized graph allows these graph algorithms to obtain similar results 
from the original. To achieve this, they adopt linear programming approach to determine 
the new edge weights of the anonymized graph. 
Research trends in this area have been focusing on providing mechanism to 
counter vertex re-identification attack. However, there is still lacking in providing unified 
privacy measurement to quantify the amount of privacy gained. Currently, ݇-anonymity 
principle has been the most employed privacy measurements. The ݇-anonymity privacy 
measure was first proposed for tabular data anonymization. Applying ݇-anonymity to 
graph data requires the researcher to assume the graph properties that possibly become 
the prior information to re-identify vertices. This information includes vertex labels and 
the structural properties of the graph that associate vertices. During vertex re-
identification attack, the adversaries manipulate one or more graph feature to partition the 
graph into vertex equivalence classes. Vertices with equivalent features (according to the 
adversary background knowledge) will appear in the same class. A vertex is re-identified 
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if any class contain only one vertex. To achieve k-anonymity, the graph is modified so 
each vertex in the graph has equivalent features with at least ݇ other vertices. 
 
TABLE 2.1     Summary of k-anonymity models for social network data anonymization 
k-Anonymity 
Model 
Anonymization 
Subject Data Model 
Anonymization 
Strategy 
Utility 
Control 
Metric 
k-automorphism 
[37] Identity 
Simple 
undirected 
graph 
Edge addition Amount of Change 
k-isomorphism 
[38] 
Identity and 
social link 
Simple 
undirected 
graph 
Edge and vertex 
addition 
Amount of 
Change 
k-
Neighbourhood 
[19] 
Identity and 
attribute 
Undirected 
graph with 
vertex label 
Edge addition 
and label 
generalization 
Amount of 
Change 
t-Confidence 
[48] Social ink 
Simple 
undirected 
graph 
Edge deletion 
and edge swap Probability 
k-Symetry [46] Identity 
Simple 
undirected 
graph 
Vertex and edge 
duplication 
Amount of 
Change 
k-Degree [41] Identity 
Simple 
undirected 
graph 
Edge addition 
or deletion 
Amount of 
Change 
SANGREEA 
[51] 
Identity, social 
link and 
attribute 
Undirected 
graph with 
vertex label 
Generalization Probability 
ANÓNIMOS 
[52] 
Social link 
attribute 
Directed graph 
with edge label Edge label 
Linear 
Programming 
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2.7 Utility Measurement 
The modification made in transforming the data to anonymized version may 
affect the utility of the data. Utility means the original content or information of the data. 
It is necessary for an anonymization algorithm to balance between privacy protection and 
utility loss during anonymizing operation. Ideal algorithms should promote small 
anonymization cost because the smaller the cost, the more similar the anonymized graph 
to the original. Several studies that associated with measuring and controlling the amount 
of utility loss were found in literature [53, 54]. However, they were focusing on micro 
data. The review of the methods adopted in measuring controlling and utility loss in 
social network  is given in the next sections. 
2.7.1 Number-of-change Approach 
In social network data, existing researches mainly consider the amount-of-change 
approach to control utility loss. This approach counts the number of insertion and 
deletion of edges and vertices during anonymization operation as used in [19, 37, 38, 41, 
42]. Given an original network ܩ ൌ ሺܸǡ ܧሻand its anonymized versionܩതതതത ൌ ሺ തܸ ǡ ܧതሻ, the 
utility loss ሺܷܮሻ based on number of change inܩതതതതis defined as 
ܷܮሺܩǡ ܩҧሻ ൌ  ൤ሺȁܸሺܩሻ ׫ തܸሺܩҧሻȁሻ െ ሺȁܸሺܩሻ ת തܸሺܩҧሻȁሻ ൅ሺȁܧሺܩሻ ׫ ܧതሺܩҧሻȁሻ െ ሺȁܧሺܩሻ ת ܧതሺܩҧሻȁሻ ൨   (2.1) 
where ܷܮሺܩǡ ܩҧሻis the information loss between ܩand ܩҧ,  ܸ is the set of vertices and ܧ is 
the set of edge. The above equation, however, does not take into account the event of 
vertex moving during anonymization which eventually maintains the same number of 
vertex in both graphs. 
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Most of existing works in anonymizing social network adopted this approach. Liu 
and Terzi [41] adopt dynamic programming and greedy algorithm to ensure minimal 
difference between the original and the anonymized graph in terms of edge changes. 
Zhou and Pei’s [19, 42] consider the total number of edges added and the number of 
vertices that are not in the neighborhood of the target vertex and are linked to the 
anonymized neighborhood for the purpose of anonymization. Zou et al. [37] used a 
metric called ‘Edit Distance’ which basically counts the number of graph edit operation. 
Another work in [38] controls the utility loss by preferring the largest frequent sub graphs 
during anonymization to impose less graph modification. The total cost of anonymization 
is still calculated by the amount of changes made during perturbation. The number-of-
change is still important for minimizing the amount of modification imposes on the 
network graph.  However, relying on this metric only disregards the impact of structural 
properties of the social network graph. 
2.7.2 Probability Approach 
The utility loss in this approach quantifies the probability of error when trying to 
reconstruct the structure of the original network from its anonymized version. Campan 
and Truta [51] proposed this approach in calculating the utility of their proposed method 
by imposing it on two components: the intra-cluster structural loss and the inter-cluster 
structural loss components. 
Given ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ as a social network graph, let ݈ܿ as a cluster of verticesݒ א ܸ, and 
ܩ௖௟ ൌ ሺ݈ܿǡ ܧ௖௟ሻ be the sub graph induced by ݈ܿ. When ݈ܿ is collapsed in the anonymized 
graph ܩ෠to become super vertex ܥ݈ described by the pairሺȁ݈ܿȁǡ ȁܧ௖௟ȁሻ , the probability of 
an edge to exist between any pair of vertices is 
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 ȁܧ௖௟ȁ ൫ȁ௖௟ȁଶ ൯൘
      (2.2) 
The intra-cluster structural information loss is the probability of wrongly labelling 
a pair of nodes in ݈ܿ as an edge or as an unconnected pair. Since there are ȁܧ௖௟ȁ edges, and 
൫ȁ௖௟ȁଶ ൯ െ ȁܧ௖௟ȁ pairs of unconnected vertices in ݈ܿ, intra-cluster structural information loss 
is given as [51] 
݅݊ݐݎ݈ܽܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܫܮሺ݈ܿሻ ൌ ʹ ή ȁܧ௖௟ȁ ή ቌͳ െ ȁܧ௖௟ȁ ൫ȁ௖௟ȁଶ ൯൘
ቍ   (2.3) 
The inter-cluster structural information loss is the probability of wrongly labelling a pair 
of vertices (v, u), where ݒ א ݈ܿ௜ and ݑ א ܿ ௝݈  and ݅ ് ݆ as an edge or as an unconnected 
pair. Since there are ቚܧ௖௟೔ǡ௖௟ೕቚ edges, and ൫ȁ݈ܿ௜ȁ ή หܿ ௝݈ห൯ െ ቚܧ௖௟೔௖௟ೕቚ pairs of unconnected 
nodes between ݈ܿ௜ and ܿ ௝݈, inter-cluster structural information loss is given using the 
same reasoning manner as intra-cluster structural information loss, 
݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܫܮሺ݈ܿሻ ൌ ʹ ή ቚܧ௖௟೔ǡ௖௟ೕቚ ή
ۉ
ۈ
ۇͳ െ ቚܧ௖௟೔ǡ௖௟ೕቚ ൫ȁ݈ܿ௜ȁ ή หܿ ௝݈ห൯
൙
ی
ۋ
ۊ
  (2.4) 
Thus, the total structural information lost is the summation of the amount of intra 
cluster information loss and inter-cluster information loss given by  
݅݊ݐݎ݈ܽܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܫܮሺ݈ܿሻ + ݅݊ݐ݁ݎ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎܫܮሺ݈ܿሻ    (2.5) 
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This method has been used to calculate the information loss from anonymization 
operation using generalization approach where all the vertices in a group were collapsed 
to become super vertices and all the edges between clusters were also collapsed to 
become single super edge. The suitability of this method calculating utility loss for the 
usage with other than generalization anonymization approach is still in question. 
2.7.3 Graph Properties Approach 
The utility of social network data is mostly related to the structure of the network 
among vertices. This also often referred to as graph topological properties. Given the fact 
that social network is a complex graph, there are many aspects of the structure of a 
network, such as the path length, degree distribution, transitivity, diameter, betweenness, 
and closeness. These are often referred to as graph properties. The following are 
description of each property [30]: 
x Path length - This is a measure of the distance between any two vertices in social 
network data. For example, Let ݈ ൌ ሺݒǡ ݑሻ denote the length of the shortest path 
between vertex ݒand ݑ (or the distance between ݒandݑ). The diameter of a 
network is the largest distance between any two nodes in the network, 
݀݅ܽ݉݁ݐ݁ݎ ൌ ௩ǡ௨ ݈ሺݒǡ ݑሻ. The average path length is the average distance 
between any two vertices in the networkσ ௟ሺ௩ǡ௨ሻೡಱೕ௡ሺ௡ିଵሻ ଶൗ
. 
x Degree Distribution - Degree is the number of connection that a vertex has. 
Degree distribution is a description of relative frequencies of vertices that have 
different degrees in social network data. To measure the change of degree 
distributions, the distance between degree histograms of the original and the 
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anonymous graphs is calculated. The degree distribution measures for social 
network data is bound with power-law distribution. This is due to the vertices that 
has very high number of degree is usually less than low degree 
x Transitivity - the distributions of the size of the connected component that a 
vertex belongs to. 
x Diameter - is the maximum shortest path in the network.  
x Betweenness – this property represents proportion of shortest paths that pass 
through a vertex.  
x Closeness – this property represent the average distance of a vertex to all other 
vertex in the graph.  
x Clustering coefficient – this is a measure of degree to which vertices in a graph 
tend to cluster together. Intuitively, clustering coefficient measures the closeness 
of the vertex and its neighbours in the graph and determines whether the graph 
has the small world characteristics. Given a networkܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ, the average 
clustering coefficient ܿܿሺܩሻis given by   
ܿܿሺܩሻ ൌ ͵ ൈ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ݋݂ݐݎ݈݅ܽ݊݃݁݅݊ݐ݄݁݊݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ݋݂ܿ݋݊݊݁ܿݐ݁݀ݐݎ݅݌݌݈݁ݏ݋݂ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ܿ݁ݏሺʹǤ͸ሻ 
where a “connected triple" refers to a vertex with edges to an unordered pair of vertices. 
To measure the information loss, the difference of clustering coefficients between the 
original and the anonymous graph is calculated.  
When a social network graph is anonymized, the resulting graph loses some 
utility as compared with the original graph [55]. There are attempts to preserve these 
properties of a social network graph anonymization. Research done by [56] and [57] 
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considers local community structure as subject of utility preservation. In [56], they 
proposed an approach in which the graph is partitioned by local structure. They use 
multilevel k-way partitioning scheme as a method to extract the local structure. Each 
partition is treated as one single unit to be anonymized. Using this approach, they aim to 
preserve the original communities from the original graph. The amount-of-change metric 
is still subscribed in order to minimize the amount of perturbation. On the other hand, the 
work in [57] proposed a metric called ‘Hierarchical Community Entropy (HCE)’ to 
represent the graph community structure. The metric is then heuristically used in edge 
perturbation. The amount-of-change metric is also considered to achieve minimum 
perturbation. Compared to [56] which separates each local community, this approach 
however prefers to bridge every local communities in their edge perturbation scheme. 
The work in [58] aims to maintain the role structure and the edge betweenness in 
of a social network. They argue that, the role structure reflects the structural semantics of 
a social network. They also leverage the edge betweenness properties in order to 
minimize changes in shortest paths during edge perturbation process. These metrics is 
then heuristically used to perturb the edge of network graph. While role structure may be 
considered as a good metric to represent structural utility, the calculation of betweenness 
for an edge involves all vertices in the network. Applying this metric heuristically in each 
edge perturbation would result in very expensive operation. 
Modifying social graph prior publishing is the most common approach used to 
preserve privacy. Consequently, the anonymized graphs will have loss the original 
information, and therefore has less utility than original graphs. To estimate utility loss, 
many existing works use the number of edges that are altered during the anonymization 
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process (i.e. added/removed/switched of edges and vertices) and then using heuristics 
approach to control or minimizing the damage. However, the utility of social network 
data is mostly related to the structure of the connection network among vertices. These 
properties, which include degree distributions, cluster coefficients, length of shortest 
paths, and connectivity, are more closely related to graph applications in the real world 
than the amount of changes. The relationship between the number changed edges and 
those frequently used utility measures was not highly regarded in most of existing works. 
2.8 Summary 
 Publishing social network data to third parties has prompted privacy concern.  In 
this chapter, we give an overview of privacy in social network. We presented the high 
level component of social network that consist of users, applications, service provider and 
third party data recipients. We also presented the threat model and discussed about 
privacy breach categories, background knowledge that is potentially used by adversaries 
to breach privacy, data mapping mechanism and also privacy implication. We also 
reviewed a number of methods, approaches, strategies and techniques in privacy-
preserving social network data publishing. In conclusion, privacy-preserving publishing 
of social networks remains a challenging problem, since graph problems are typically 
difficult and there can be many different ways of adversary attacks. It is an important 
problem and it will be interesting to look for new solutions to the issue of privacy 
preservation model and utility quantification methods. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Framework 
 
In this chapter, we describe the data model used in this thesis and give definition of 
several concepts used in this thesis. The datasets and evaluation measurements used in 
this thesis are also described. 
3.1 Data Models 
A social network is generally modelled as a graph consisting of a set of entities and 
the connections between them. As previous studies [19, 37, 38, 41, 42, 57, 59], we model 
a social network data as a graph characterized as ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ where ܸ ൌ ሼݒଵǡ ݒଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݒ௡ሽ is a 
set of ݊ unlabeled vertices representing individuals in the social network data. We use 
data representation which has social links that describe the relationship between actors in 
general. We only focus on social links therefore we omit user data. We allow only binary 
relationships in our model and consider all relationships as being of the same type. Thus, 
we represent the social links between individuals via unlabeled undirected edges ܧ ك
ܸ ൈ ܸ. We define ݊ ൌ ȁܸȁand ݉ ൌ ȁܧȁas the total number of vertices and edges inܩ, 
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respectively. We denote ݀ሺ݅ሻ as the degree of vertexݒ௜ א ܸ, which is the number of the 
vertices connected to vertex ݒ௜ א ܸ. Fig. 1 shows an example of the social network graph. 
There are ten vertices ݒ ൌ ሼܣǡ ܤǡ ܥǡ ܦǡ ܧǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܪǡ ܫǡ ܬሽ and each vertex is connected to at 
least one other vertex. 
We model the social network data as a graph characterized as ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ where 
ܸ ൌ ሼݒଵǡ ݒଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݒ௡ሽ is a set of ݊ vertices representing individuals in the social network. 
We represent the social links between individuals via unlabeled undirected edgesܧ ك
ܸ ൈ ܸ. We assume that the data the publisher releases is a useful social network data in a 
way that satisfies the third parties need while at the same time preserving private 
information about the individuals in the data. To this end, we assume that the social 
network data graph ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ is sanitized into ܩҧሺ തܸ ǡ ܧതሻ before publishing using k-
anonymization mechanism. The example of social network is illustrated in Fig 3.1. 
3.2 Concept Definitions 
We consider structural-based vertex re-identification attacks where an adversary 
performs structural query over a released social network data in trying to locate the 
targeted individual and to breach their privacy. Thus, we assume the real-world 
individuals behind the vertices in the original social network ܩ are sensitive. We define 
structural query and identity re-identification attack as follows: 
 
DEFINITION 3.1: Structural Query. Given a social networkܩ and a target 
individualݐ א ܸ, query ݍ refers to the activity where an adversary tries to search ݐ from 
ܩ using limited information as a priori knowledge. The result of ݍ is a set of vertices ሖܸ ؿ
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ܸ called matching vertices. If ݍ is based on the topological information about ݐ inܩ, then 
this is called topological query. 
 
DEFINITION 3.2: Vertex Re-identification Attack. Given a released networkܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ, 
the adversary performs structural query ݍoverܩ. If the cardinality of matched vertices is 
1, then the target ݐis definitely identified. If the cardinality of matched vertices is 2, then 
the target ݐis re-identified with 50% probability. 
 
DEFINITION 3.3: Degree Property. Given a social network graph ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ, ݒ א ܸ is a 
vertex in ܩ and ݑ ൌ ሼݑଵǡ ݑଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݑ௡ሽ is a set of vertices in ܩ that connects directly to ݒ 
referred to as neighbours of ݒ where ݑ ് ݒ. The degree property of ݒ is the total number 
of ݑ denoted as݀ሺݒሻ ൌ  ȁݑȁ. 
 
Usually, published social network data have been naïvely anonymized where all 
the identifiable attributes have been sanitized and suppressed. However, vertex re-
identification is still possible if the adversary use topological query to find target victim. 
Topological query manipulates network topology information around the target victim. 
We give the formal definition of topological query as below: 
DEFINITION 3.4: Topological Query. Given a social networkܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ and a target 
individualݐ א ܸ, query ݍ refers to the activity where an adversary tries to map ݐ in ܩ 
using his/her background knowledgeߚ. The result of ݍ is a set of verticesሖܸ ؿ ܸ called 
matched vertices. If ߚ is based on the network topological properties about ݐ inܩ, then 
this is called topological query. 
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An adversary ࣛ is interested in deriving private information of a target victim ݐ. 
Firstly, the adversary needs to find the specific vertex ݒҧ א ܸഥ  that associates with ݐ and 
then accessing the sensitive attribute values fromݒҧ א ܸഥ . In order to find ݒҧ, the adversary 
must have some background knowledge about ݐ. Background knowledge is the limited 
information about ݐ that the adversary manipulates to query ത in the released network 
with the goal to link ݐ and ݒҧ. Since the released network ܩҧሺ തܸ ǡ ܧതሻ is anonymized, it is not 
possible to find target victim using personal attributes. Assume that the adversary has 
gathered some pieces of topological information aboutݐ. Using this knowledge, the 
adversary then performs query from the released dataset to re-identify the target victim. 
One practical way to provide stronger anonymization is to employ K-anonymity 
principle on semi-identifiable attributes like birth date, postcode, etc. [60]. In this regard, 
the attributes is suppressed or perturbed so that the adversary will not be able to 
manipulate those attributes to re-identify the target individual with a probability higher 
than ଵ௞. Identity re-identification attack using semi-identifiable attribute has been well 
studied in micro-data privacy-preserving area [61]. However, social network data consist 
of multiple type of information. Besides personal attributes (identifiable and semi-
identifiable) which often represented to as labels, social network data also consists of 
relationship information that forming the social network. The social network data often 
represented as social graph which consist of vertices and social links among them. It is 
possible that even after the anonymization of personal attributes, adversaries could still 
manipulate the social links structure to query targeted individual in the data. Thus, the 
application of k-anonymity principle on social network data needs to include the 
structural-based anonymity besides personal attribute anonymity. 
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To prevent identity disclosure from vertex re-identification attack, the social 
network graph is modified according to k-anonymity principle. To formerly define k-
anonymity, the type of a priori knowledge or background knowledge of the adversary 
need to first be specified. For generality, we denote background knowledge asߚ. The k-
anonymity principle is defined as follows: 
 
DEFINITION 3: K-anonymity. Given a graphܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ, and a background knowledgeߚ, 
ܩ satisfies k-anonymity againstߚ, iff for eachݒ א ܸ, there are at least  ݇  other vertices 
in ܸ with the same ߚ features. 
3.3 Settings and Configurations  
All of the experiments have been implemented using MATLAB 2010a. The 
experiments were conducted on Pentium Dual-Core 2.50GHz machine with 3GB of 
RAM running with Windows 7 Enterprise. 
3.3.1 Datasets 
To study the performance of the proposed anonymization approach, we run the 
algorithms on four datasets; two are real and two are synthetic datasets. These will allow 
us see how our approach performs in different topologies. The datasets used are 
summarized as follows and TABLE 3.1 lists some of its structural properties: 
x PolBooks: This is a network of books about US politics sold by an online store. 
Edges between books represent their frequent purchase by the same buyers. 
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x Jazz Musician Network: A network of jazz musicians who collaborate in 
different bands. The vertices represent the band and edges represent the 
musicians in common. 
x Scale-Free: This is a synthetic network which based on Barabasi’s model. This 
data have a power-law vertex degree distribution which is one of the key 
properties exhibited by social networks. 
x Random: This is a synthetic random network based on Erdos-Renyi model. 
The vertices in this network are randomly connected based on probability p. 
x Small-World: A small-world graph is a type of graph in which most vertices 
can be reached from every other vertex by a small number of hops. 
 
TABLE 3.1 Structural properties of datasets. 
Dataset Vertices Edges Avg. 
Betwenness 
Avg. Path 
Length 
Avg. 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
PolBook 105 441 0.0404 3.0494 0.4875 
Jazz 198 2742 0.0126 2.2238 0.6175 
SF 300 1176 0.0165 3.4428 0.0880 
RA 300 22413 0.0034 1.4962 0.4986 
 
3.3.2 Evaluation Measures 
In order to evaluate the proposed approaches, we calculate a number of social 
network analysis metrics on the outputs of the anonymized graph and compare them with 
the output from the original unmodified graph. The idea is to observe the amount of 
deviation from the original line. The output from the anonymized graph that provides 
closer measurements to the output of the original network is intuitively more useful for 
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analysis. Specifically, we measure the qualitative performance based on four important 
network metrics: 
i. Average Clustering Coefficient (ACC) – This metric measures the closeness of the 
vertex and its neighbours in the graph and determines whether the graph has the 
small world characteristics. 
ii. Average Path Length (APL) – this metric represent the average distance between 
all the vertex pairs in the network.  
iii. Average Betweeness (ABW) – this metric represent the importance of a particular 
vertex in terms of the number of times the vertex is included in the shortest paths 
between vertex pairs in the network. 
 
3.4 Summary 
We described the data model and gave the definitions of concepts used in this 
thesis. We also stated all the datasets and the evaluation measurements used in all of the 
experiments in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Vertex Re-identification Attack 
using Neighbourhood-Pair 
Properties 
 
Vertex re-identification attack aims to link specific vertex in social network data 
to specific individual in real world. The goal is to access private/sensitive information 
like sensitive attributes or relationships of the targeted individual in order to breach 
privacy. Even when a released network hides the identity of the users by removing names 
and other identifiable attributes, re-identification attack is still possible by manipulating 
abstract information. In this chapter, we identify a new type of vertex re-identification 
attack called neighbourhood-pair attack. This attack utilizes the information of local 
communities of two connected vertices in order to identify the target individual. We show 
both theoretically and empirically that the proposed attack provides higher re-
identification rate compared to existing re-identification attacks that manipulates 
structural properties of social graph. In the experiments, we show that the proposed attack 
is still possible on anonymized social network data. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Vertex re-identification attack is one of the significant problems in preserving 
social network data privacy. The goal of the attack is to link a specific target of real-
world identity to a specific vertex in published social network data. The privacy of an 
individual is breached if an adversary successfully re-identifies the target individual with 
high certainty and eventually obtains his/her sensitive information from the social 
network data. For example, many mobile-based social network applications have the 
capabilities to tag current geographic location of its users. The users, who are aware 
about the privacy concern, will regard this kind of information as sensitive. Thus, they 
choose to hide this particular information from public views but remain viewable to 
limited people in his/her closed network. As the application provider publishes the social 
network graph to support analysis activities, the user’s privacy is breached if an adversary 
were able to obtain his location logs in specific period of time. Another example, a health 
institution provides a dedicated online social network to their patients as a mean to 
improve their service efficiency. All users have a personal profile with various type of 
sensitive medical information which they need to provide in order to enable continuous 
monitoring by the institution, the patients and other connected users. The online 
application also allows the users to response with the online services provided by the 
institution as well as interacting with other users. Assume the health institution releases a 
dataset consist of a network of few thousand patients in order to support research and 
analysis activities. 
Prior to obtaining the sensitive information, the adversary first needs to specify 
which vertex in the released network data that represents the targeted individual. A target 
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individual ݐ is re-identified if an adversary were able to find ݐ in published social network 
data with very high certainty. The re-identification task consists of queries with certain 
parameters, which are the information that the adversary knows about the target victim. 
The parameters also referred to as background knowledge. Social network data consist of 
link connections among vertices which could be manipulated by adversaries to re-identify 
target victim with high confidence [62]. Therefore, basic anonymization task by 
removing name or other person identifiable information from social network data before 
releasing the data is insufficient to protect the users from being re-identified [5],[34].  
Preventing social link structure from being manipulated for vertex re-
identification is very challenging [19]. This is because a social network data can has 
various structural dimensions that exposed for manipulation. An anonymized social 
network data that is resilient to certain type of re-identification attack may still leave 
rooms for re-identification attack that manipulates different structural topologies.  
In this chapter, we identify a new type of re-identification attack called 
neighbourhood-pair attack. This attack utilizes the neighbourhood topology of a pair 
connected vertices as the query parameter to re-identify targeted victims in a released 
social network data. We also identify a technique to transform the neighbourhood-pair 
topology into coefficient form. In summary, the following are the main contributions 
were made in this chapter:  
i. We identify new topological information which utilizes neighbourhood-pair 
information to re-identify target victim in released social network data.  
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ii. We propose a method to transform the neighbourhood-pair properties into 
coefficient form in order to improve the practicality of the attack.  
iii. We conducted extensive comparisons between the proposed attack and existing 
attacks. 
4.2 Background 
In this section we discuss the topological properties that often exploited for 
querying target vertex in social network data. At the end of this section, we define and 
demonstrate the background of the problem. 
4.2.1 Topological Properties 
Several works has been reported in the direction identifying certain topological 
properties that are possible to be manipulated for re-identification attack. For example, 
Degree Attack [41] manipulates the number of links of the target victim. In this attack, 
the adversary has the knowledge about the number of person of target victim and uses it 
to query the victim from the published dataset. Neighbourhood Attack, on the other hand, 
is based on the neighbourhood of the target victim that assumes the adversary also knows 
the links among the direct neighbours of  the target vertex [19, 42]. The illustration of 
neighbourhood and degree topologies is given is given in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b. As can 
be seen, the degree topology only counts the number of link of a vertex while 
neighbourhood topology takes into account the connectivity status among each of those 
links. In Fig. 4.1 (b), two of vertex 4’s neighbours are connected. This translates to the 
status that vertex #4 has four close friends who two of them are also close friends. 
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Fig. 4.1 Example of topological properties for vertex #4. 
Some other researchers also argue that the adversary may know more information 
about the link structure that surrounding the target victim and perform Sub-graph Attack 
[19],[37],[38],[46],[63]. This is possible by performing a series of lookups from several 
different users that has path to the targeted individual. The adversary then learns a large 
structure of connection pattern among a set of large amount of vertices surrounding the 
target victim. If such link structure were found unique in the released dataset, then the 
victim could be re-identified. An example of this type of background knowledge is given 
in Fig. 4.1 (c). 
Most of the proposed sub-graph attacks do not put any restrictions on the size of 
the sub-graph that an adversary could possibly know. Except for Friendship Attack [63], 
other works assume the adversary could know up to the whole set of vertices in the 
graph. This assumption could be too strong and less practical in real-world. On top of 
that, the anonymization model that would be built on this perspective would be very 
difficult to be realized without suffering severe utility loss. This is due to the heavy 
structural modification requirement in order to hide such amount of information from 
being manipulated. Therefore, there is a gap between strong structural-based attack and 
practical information that is more realistic to be gathered. 
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4.2.2 Problem Overview 
The effectiveness of the background knowledge to re-identify vertex is quantified 
by the cardinality of vertices in the return set of a structural query. Those vertices in the 
return set are the vertices in the released network that have matched with the query 
parameters. The smaller the cardinality of the matching vertices is, the higher the 
probability that the target victim could be re-identified from the dataset. Particularly, the 
target victim could be definitely re-identified with 100% certainty if and only if the 
cardinality of the matching vertices is 1. 
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Fig. 4.2 An anonymized graph ܩҧ. 
Fig. 4.2 is an example of an anonymized network ܩҧ that satisfies a few k-
anonymity concepts. Assume the targeted victim is a person who in this graph has been 
anonymized as vertex #4. Supposed that the adversary knows several types of structural 
properties about the targeted victim and perform structural query to the graph in trying to 
re-identify the target from the graph. 
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EXAMPLE 1: Degree Attack. Assume the adversary has background knowledgeߚଵ, in 
which the target victim is connected to 4 other users (refer to Fig. 4.1a). The matching 
vertices under this type of background knowledge areߚଵ ൌ ሼ͵ǡͶǡͷǡ͸ሽ. Thus, given the 
knowledgeߚଵ, the adversaries only can identify John with probability ¼. 
EXAMPLE 2: Neighbourhood Attack. Using background knowledgeߚଶ, which is the 
neighbourhood of the target victim, the adversary knows that the victim has four users 
connected to him, and two of them are also connected to each other (refer to Fig. 4.1b). 
The matching set under this type of background knowledge isߚଶ ൌ ሼ͵ǡͶǡͷǡ͸ሽ. Thus, 
given the knowledgeߚଶ, the adversaries can only identify John with probability ¼. 
Indeed, the graph network satisfies two types of k-anonymity model namely k-
degree [41] and k-neighbourhood [19],[42]. In the next section, we will introduce an 
approach of re-identification attack that could break the anonymity that already achieved 
in Fig 4.2. 
4.3 Neighbourhood-pair Attack 
In this section, we present the new vertex re-identification attack called 
neighbourhood-pair attack. This attack manipulates the neighbourhood information of a 
pair connected vertices. We also introduce a mechanism to transform the neighbourhood-
pair information into coefficient form. This yields to a simple yet comprehensive single-
representation of the topology that will make the task of re-identification become much 
easier.  
In [19],[37],[38], it is assumed that the adversary knows the local community 
structures which comprise a set of structural information regarding a target vertex in a 
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social network. This is a strong assumption albeit not an extraordinary one. The 
justification behind this is that a social network user usually knows who his friends are, 
and may also know some of his friends’s friends. It is natural for an adversary to identify 
the target from its local community to which the targeted individual belongs. Therefore, 
such background knowledge represents more general yet multi-dimensional information 
about the targeted individual.  
In contrast, we assume that ࣛ knows the neighbourhood-pair information of the 
target victim. Thus, we define the Neighbourhood-Pair as follows:  
DEFINITION 1: Neighbourhood-pair Attack (NP). Given a target individualݐ, a 
Neighbourhood-pair exploits the neighbourhood information of vertex  ݒҧ א ܸഥ  and ݑത א ܸഥ  
targeting to identify ݐ in ܩ where ݑത is an adjacent vertex of a vertex ݒҧ such that ݒҧ ് ݑത.  
PROPOSITION 1: Neighbourhood-Pair attack has higher re-identification rate than 
degree and neighbourhood attack. 
PROOF. Let ݒ௝  be a set of vertices, ݑ௞ be another set of vertices that are directly 
connected to ݒ௝  where ݑ௞ ് ݒ௝. Given ܦሺݒ௝ሻ as the number of neighbours for vertex ݒ௝  
called degree and ܰሺݒ௝ሻ as the information about the relationship among ݑ௞ called 
neighbourhood, then ݀ሺݒ௝ሻ ؿ ܰሺݒ௝ሻ. Given ܰܲ൛ܰ൫ݒ௝൯ǡ ܰሺݒ௟ሻൟ as the pair of 
neighbourhood for vertex ݒ௝  and ݒ௟, then clearly ܰሺݒ௝ሻ ؿ ܰܲൣܰ൫ݒ௝൯ǡ ܰሺݒ௟ሻ൧. Thus, we 
getܰܲ൛ܰ൫ݒ௝൯ǡ ܰሺݒ௟ሻൟ ـ ܰሺݒ௝ሻ ـ ܦሺݒ௝ሻ. Having that, it is shown that the pair-
neighbourhood topology has more general characteristic of the social graph structure; 
hence, increase the probability of the targeted victim to be re-identified. 
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Now we give an example of structural query using neighbourhood-pair information. 
EXAMPLE 3: Neighbourhood-Pair Attack. Using the information of the neighbourhood-
pair of the target as the background knowledgeߚଷ, the adversary knows that of the 4 
users connected to the target, two of them are also connected to each other. As previously 
shown in EXAMPLE 1 and EXAMPLE 2, this information gives ¼ probabilities to the 
adversary to re-identify John. However, the adversary also knows that one of the 
neighbours is connected to five users where two of them known each other. 
Consequently, John is still can be uniquely re-identified as vertex #4. 
Handling the neighbourhood-pair information is not as easy as some other 
structural information. Unlike the degree information where the adversary only has to 
remember the number of friend of the target victim and perform mapping straightly with 
it, the neighbourhood-pair involve a large set of vertices and their link connections. In 
order to facilitate the re-identification using neighbourhood-pair, we identify a technique 
to transform the neighbourhood information into a coefficient form that is simple yet 
comprehensive enough to represent the neighbourhood set of a given vertex. Using this 
coefficient, it increases the practicality of manipulating the information for structural 
query. We define the Neighbourhood Coefficient as follows: 
 
DEFINITION 2: Neighbourhood Coefficient (NC). Given a set of vertices that comprise 
a neighbourhood of vertexݒ, the neighbourhood coefficient is calculated by: 
ܰܥ ൌ ݀ሺݒሻ ൅ ߛሺݒሻߜሺݒሻ ൅ ݀ሺݒሻሺͶǤͳሻ 
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where ߛሺݒሻ is the proportion of links between the vertices within neighbourhood 
ݒrespectively defined by ߛሺݒሻ ൌ ൛݁௜௝ ׷ ݒ௜ǡ ݒ௝ א ܰǡ ݁௜௝ א ܧൟ, ߜሺݒሻ is the maximum 
number of links that could possibly exist between the vertices within the neighborhood 
respectively defined by ൣௗሺ௩ሻήሾௗሺ௩ሻିଵሿ൧ଶ  and ݀ሺݒሻ is the degree of vertex ݒ. 
EXAMPLE 4: Neighbourhood Coefficient. Using the neighbourhood sub-graph in Fig. 
4.1 (c), vertex 4 has four neighbours and two of them are connected together. To 
transform this information into the coefficient, we take the number of links exist among 
the neighbours calculate the maximum links that possibly exist among them. We found 
that only one connection exists among the neighbours out of the maximum possible 
connections. To get the maximum possible connection, the calculation isൣȁସȁήሾȁସȁିଵሿ൧ଶ . The 
denominator is 2 because the graph considered here is undirected. Having that, the 
neighbourhood coefficient isͶ ൅ ଵ଺ାସ ൌ ͶǤͳͲͲͲ. 
The step for transforming a graph into its neighbourhood coefficient is given in 
Algorithm 1. For each vertex, the algorithm first counts the neighbours. Then it counts on 
the connection that exists among the neighbours excluding the connection from subject 
vertex ݒ to its neighbours. In line 4, the algorithm calculates the maximum connection 
that possible to exist among the neighbours. The output of the algorithm is a list consists 
of all vertices transformed into neighbourhood coefficient.  
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Having the neighbourhood coefficient list, the adversary can then perform 
mapping using the particular neighbourhood-pair coefficient of the target victim that he 
already has in hand. The neighbourhood-pair is transcribed as: 
 ܰܲ ൌ ሾܰܥ௩ǡ ܰܥ௨ሿሺͶǤʹሻ 
where ܰܲ is neighbourhood-pair, ܰܥ is the Neighbourhood Coefficient defined in (1), ݒ 
is the targeted victim and ݑ is one of the neighbours of ݒ. 
4.4 Result and Discussion 
In this section we discuss the results obtained from the experiments. The purposes 
of the experiment are, first, to compare the performance of the proposed attack with other 
existing attacks. The second purpose is to observe the outcome when the data is 
anonymized by certain topological properties. We carried the experiment on 
unanonymized and anonymized network with different anonymization principles and 
settings. First, we perform re-identification attack on the original unanonimized networks 
data. We compare the outputs of the neighbourhood-pair attack with other attacks namely 
Algorithm 1 Extracting Dataset with Neighbourhood Coefficient 
Input: ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ 
Output: ܰܥ 
1. FOR EACH ݒ א ܩ   
2.         set ݀ሺݒሻ ՚ ݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݑݎݏ݋݂ܸǤ 
3.         setߛሺݒሻ ՚ ݁ݔ݅ݏݐ݅݊݃݈݅݊݇ܽ݉݋݊݃݀ሺݒሻ. 
4.         set ߜሺݒሻ ՚ ൣȁௗሺ௩ሻȁήሾȁௗሺ௩ሻȁିଵሿ൧ଶ . 
5.         ܰܥ௩ ՚ ݀ሺݒሻ ൅ ఊሺ௩ሻఋሺ௩ሻାௗሺ௩ሻ 
6. END 
7. return ܰܥ. 
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degree attack and neighbourhood attack. After that we perform the re-identification on 
the network data that have been anonymized. In this setting, we employed two k-
anonymization models: degree-based anonymization model and neighbourhood-based 
anonymization model. For each model, we anonymized the network by five 
anonymization strengths denote as݇ ൌ ሼʹǡ Ͷǡ ͸ǡ ͺǡ ͳͲሽ. To measure the outcome, we count 
the number of re-identified vertices with 100% certainty. Higher number of re-identified 
vertices indicates stronger attack properties. We compare the output of the proposed 
neighbourhood-pair attack with degree attack and neighbourhood attack.  
4.4.1 Re-identification Attack on Un-anonymized Networks 
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of re-identification attacks on 
unanonymized networks. We compare the re-identification rate between the proposed 
neighbourhood-pair attack and degree, and neighbourhood attack. For the comparison 
metric, we use re-identification rate percentage defined as follow: 
ܴǤ ܴܽݐ݁ ൌ ݒȁݒȁ
෪ ή ͳͲͲሺͶǤ͵ሻ 
where ݒ෤ is the matching vertices and ȁݒȁ is the total number of vertices in the social 
network data. Fig. 4.3 demonstrates the performance of all three vertex re-identification 
attacks over five different un-anonymized networks. The X-axis is the percentage of 
vertices in the network that are exposed to re-identification attack and the Y-axis is the 
network datasets. We only consider the vertices that are definitely re-identified with 
100% certainty. The three curves correspond to the re-identification rate of Degree 
Attack (blue), Neighbourhood Attack (red) and the proposed Neighbourhood-pair Attack 
(green) over five networks data. 
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Fig. 4.3 Re-identification on un-anonymized networks.  
The outcomes of the re-identification test on unanonymized network vary 
between each dataset but the score trends between three attacks are consistent in all 
dataset. It is obvious that by having a little more information about the local community, 
the risk of being re-identified increased significantly. The average of the re-identification 
rate for all attack in five networks is shown in Table 4.1. It is shown that the percentage 
of vertices that are definitely re-identifiable by degree attack has increased from 20% to 
more than 75% by neighbourhood attack. This implies that between the knowledge  
TABLE 4.1 The average re-identification rates 
Attack Model Avg R-Rate 
Degree Attack 21.8% 
Neighbourhood Attack 75.6% 
N-pair Attack 89.2% 
 
about the links a targeted individual has, and the knowledge how these direct links 
connected among them, has huge difference of chances to re-identify a target individual 
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in social network. Eventually, the rate has further increased by around 10% when the 
neighbourhood-pair topology information was used in query parameter. It is also worth to 
mention the contradicting trend between Scale-free (synthetic) and Jazz (real data) 
network. The Scale-free network has high re-identification rate of degree attack but 
narrower gap of the neighbourhood and neighbourhood-pair attack. The jazz network has 
the biggest gap between the re-identification rate of degree attack, and the neighbourhood 
and neighbourhood-pair attack. The obvious different between these two networks are the 
density of network. Low density network with less link connections among vertices has 
shown to contain less similarities in terms of the degree property. High density network 
will share the same properties with more vertices in the network. Polbook network and 
Random network have totally different degree distribution but tend to have quite similar 
outcome. In the next experiment, we discuss the performance of these three attacks in 
anonymized networks. 
4.4.2 Re-identification Attack on Anonymized Networks 
In this experiment, we evaluate the performance of the re-identification attacks on 
anonymized networks. We use the same five networks but we first perform 
anonymization to the network prior the re-identification task. Two anonymization models 
were employed which are degree-based anonymization and neighbourhood-based 
anonymization. Each re-identification attack is performed with different settings of 
anonymization strength denoted as݇ ൌ ሼʹǡͶǡ͸ǡͺǡͳͲሽ. This experiment has two parts:  
i. We anonymize the network according to degree anonymization model and 
perform the three series of re-identification attacks over the network.  
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ii. We anonymize the network according to neighbourhood anonymization model 
and perform the three series attacks over the network.  
In both folds, we compare the output from all three attacks between anonymized 
and unanonymized network. This experiment aims to study how the anonymized network 
of certain anonymization models react to several type of re-identification attacks. The 
other aim is to compare the performance of the proposed neighbourhood-pair attack with 
other attack on anonymized network.  
Fig. 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate the effects of neighbourhood and neighbourhood-
pair attacks over the degree-anonymized networks. Figure 3.8 demonstrate the effects of 
neighbourhood-pair attack over the neighbourhood-anonymized network. The X-axis is 
the percentage of vertices that are successfully re-identified with 100% certainty. The Y-
axis is the anonymization strength. The dotted lines correspond to the percentage of re-
identified vertices in unanonymized network while the curves correspond to the 
percentage of re-identified vertices in the degree-anonymized network with respect to 
anonymization strength݇ ൌ ሼʹǡ Ͷǡ ͸ǡ ͺǡ ͳͲሽ. The effects on the re-identification are 
showed by the gap between the dotted and the solid lines of the same type. Dotted lines 
will have consistent value which derived from the previous experiment. Solid line will 
have curves which the values correspond to different anonymization strength. 
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Fig. 4.4 Neighbourhood attack on degree-anonymized network. 
Fig 4.4 evaluates the re-identification effects on neighbourhood attack over 
degree-anonymized network. Since the network has been anonymized according to 
degree principle, the network is resilient to degree attack. Therefore, we exclude the 
output curve for degree attack because no re-identified vertices were available (zero re-
identified vertices). If we take the average of every curve, we found that the Small-world 
network has the biggest positive effects which almost 50% reduction on the number of re-
identified vertices. On the other hand, the smallest effect is found on random network 
which only benefit around 5% reductions of re-identified vertices. If we deduct the 
highest rate with the lowest, we get the range of the result which is around 58%. In this 
case the highest is the original jazz (orijazz-nb) with 90% re-identification rate and the 
lowest is anonymized small world network with 32.2% re-identification rate. We 
expected that when the anonymization strength of certain property increase, the re-
identification rate of different property should be reduced. However, the re-identification 
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effects have no clear trends with regards to anonymization strength k. This indicates that 
higher anonymization strength on specific properties does not help in protecting vertices 
from the attack that manipulates different network property. However, we also need to 
look the results in more general view. To get more general view of the curves, we 
calculate the average of the outputs by: 
ܽݒ݃௭ ൌ
ͳ
ȁݖȁ ή෍ ෍
ݖ௞
ȁ݇ȁ௞ୀሼଶǡସǡ଺ǡ଼ǡଵ଴ሽ
ሺͶሻ 
where ݖ represents the network datasets, ݇ is the anonymization strength ݇ ൌ
ሼʹǡͶǡ͸ǡͺǡͳͲሽ. That’s it, for each network data, we sum the incident in all ݇ and divide by 
ȁ݇ȁ ൌ ͷ to get the average of that particular curve. We apply this for all curves. Later we 
sum all the average values and devide by ȁݖȁ ൌ ͷ. By this, we get a single overall view of 
the outputs from all networks. We do for unanonymized data as well as anonymized data 
and compare between them. The average plots are represented in thick black dotted line 
for both un-anonymized and anonymized networks. In this view, we observe that there is 
indeed a decrement in re-identification rate between and from 75.6% in un-anonymized 
to 52.9% degree-anonymized network. 
Fig. 4.5 plots the re-identification effects on neighbourhood-pair attack over the degree-
anonymized network. As can be seen from the figure, the solid curves always reside 
lower than dotted line. This shows that the degree anonymization scheme has reduced the 
number of re-identified vertices from neighbourhood-pair attack to a certain degree. 
However, the higher anonymization strength has no significant effect on the reduction of 
re-identified vertices. This is shown by trend of all curves. When the anonymization 
strength increases, there is no significant decrement in the number of re-identified 
vertices for all networks. The figure also shows that the range between the dotted lines 
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and their respective solid lines for all network data is rather smaller than the 
neighbourhood attack in Fig 4.4. In more general view, there is only less than 14% 
reduction of re-identified vertices from 89.2% to 75.3% in average. This indicates that the 
degree-based anonymization has lower protection for neighbourhood-pair attack 
compared to the neighbourhood-attack. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Neighbourhood-pair attack on degree-anonymized network 
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Fig. 4.6 Neighbourhood-pair attack on neighbourhood-anonymized network. 
 
Fig. 4.6 demonstrates the re-identification effects on neighbourhood-pair attack 
over the neighbourhood-anonymized network. The data is resilient to degree attack and 
neighbourhood attack. Thus, we omit the result curves of those attacks because the curve 
shows zero re-identified vertices. The three average curves which shown in black dot, 
dashed and solid curves, shows that there is reduction of re-identified vertices from the 
original to degree-based anonymization and neighbourhood-based anonymization. 
Compare to the previous results, we could see that there is trend over the most curves in 
this plots which shows that the higher the anonymization strength with neighbourhood 
topology, the lower the re-identification rate of neighbourhood-pair attack. This gives 
assumption that if the anonymization strength is high enough, the data is also resilient to 
stronger topological attack such as neighbourhood-pair attack.  However, since the size of 
the background knowledge used for the attack is fixed throughout all anonymization 
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strengths, relying on k-neighbourhood anonymization approach to protect stronger attack 
will eventually sacrificing more utilities. It is wiser to have stronger k-anonymization 
approach to protect strong re-identification attack such neighbourhood-pair attack. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 The average of all re-identification rates. 
 
Fig 4.7 demonstrates the grand average of re-identification effects on 
unanonymized and anonymized version of all networks. The group on the left is the 
average re-identification rate on all unanonymized networks. The group on the middle 
and the right are the average for degree-anonymized and neighbourhood-anonymized 
networks. As can be seen in the figure, when the network is anonymized according to 
degree principle, it is resilient to degree attack but neighbourhood and neighbourhood-
pair attack are still possible. When the network is further anonymized by neighbourhood-
attack, the network is resilient to degree and neighbourhood attack. Hence, no re-
identified vertices resulted from both attacks.  Taken as a whole in these evaluations, the 
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neighbourhood-pair attack is still possible even though the anonymized network is 
resilient to degree attack and neighbourhood attack.  
4.5 Conclusion 
We highlighted a new re-identification attack called neighbourhood-pair attack. 
This attack manipulates the neighbourhood property of two connected vertices in a social 
graph network. We also proposed the coefficient transformation technique to change the 
representation of neighbourhood-pair properties in more concise form which improve the 
practicality of the attack.  We compared the performance of the attack with degree attack 
and neighbourhood attack. The results show that this attack has higher re-identification 
rate compared with the existing attacks. The anonymization of certain network properties 
does not guarantee of protection from the attacks that manipulates different network 
properties. However, the result of the experiment shows that there was a reduction in the 
number of re-identified vertices in this regard. To conclude this chapter, neighbourhood-
pair attack is still possible on degree-anonymized network and neighbourhood-
anonymized network. Thus, a new anonymization approach needs to be developed in 
order to protect a social graph from neighbourhood-pair attack, which eventually will 
also provide protection from degree attack and neighbourhood attack.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Anonymizing Social Graph by 
Neighbourhood-pair 
 
 
 In a neighbourhood-pair attack, an adversary utilizes the neighbourhood 
information of two connected vertices to re-identify the targeted victims in a published 
social network data set. In this chapter we introduce the new concept of social graph 
anonymization approach called ݇-komuniti that protects vertices from such attacks. The 
proposed method ensures that for any given neighbourhood-pair, there must be other ݇ 
similar pairs in the same social graph. This will limit the probability of re-identification 
to 1/݇. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approaches preserve 
comparable characteristic of social network in the trade of higher privacy protection. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 It has been shown that simply hiding the identities of the vertices cannot stop 
vertex re-identification of social graph. Anonymizing social graph requires the 
knowledge of the structural information that might be manipulated by an adversary to 
launch vertex re-identification attack. Previous studies have considered many types of 
network topologies that possibly be manipulated for mapping targeted vertex in released 
datasets. Many corresponding anonymization model were also proposed to protect from 
various attack manipulating certain network topologies such as degree; which anonymize 
the network by friendship links the victim has [41], neighborhood; which assumes the 
adversary knows the connection pattern among the neighbouring vertices that directly 
connected to the victim [19, 42] and sub-graph; which assumes the adversary learns the 
pattern of connections between the victim and his/her surrounding friends up to certain 
level [37, 38, 46, 59, 63]. However, all the mentioned anonymization schemes are based 
on structural information of single targeted vertex. For example, given a degree property 
of any single vertex, there should be other ݇ vertices of similar property exist in the 
released social graph.  
 It is possible that a combination of a simply-acquired structural property of 
several individuals could give stronger descriptive power than single structural property 
surrounding target. This indeed could re-identify a large fraction of individuals from a 
released network. We have shown in previous chapter that when the released graph 
satisfies ݇-anonymity on single source of structural information, it still fails to protect 
from re-identification attack that uses the same structural information of two connected 
vertices with probability of at least 1/݇.  
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In this chapter, we propose an anonymization scheme that will protect from 
neighbourhood-pair attack. As introduced in previous chapter, neighbourhood-pair attack 
happens when an adversary utilizes the neighbourhood information of two connected 
vertices to re-identify related victims in a published social network data set. An adversary 
could extract and learn the relationship information that is publicly available on various 
social networking applications. Using the collected information, the adversary can issue a 
re-identification attack on the published social network to re-identify the vertices 
corresponding to the targeted victim and his friend. To prevent from such attack, we 
proposed ݇-Komuniti anonymization scheme which guarantees that for any given pair of 
neighbourhood, there must be other similar pair exists in the given network. In addition, 
the proposed scheme also protects from existing attacks such as degree attack [41] and 
neighbourhood attack [19]. In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions: 
a. We introduce an anonymization scheme called ݇-komuniti that protects from 
vertex re-identification attack using neighbourhood-pair. 
b. We compare the performance of the proposed approach with the popular existing 
approach. 
5.2 Problem Overview 
 In this section we introduce ݇-komuniti anonymization scheme that guarantees 
protection from neighbourhood-pair attack discussed in previous chapter. We first define 
the problem of ݇-komuniti anonymization, and then we discuss the theoretical aspect of 
scheme and provide the algorithm for the implementation.  
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DEFINITION 5.1: Neighbourhood-pair Attack (NP). Given a target individualݐ, a 
Neighbourhood-pair exploits the neighbourhood information of vertex  ݒ א ܸ and ݑ א ܸ 
targeting to identify ݐ in ܩ where ݑ is an adjacent vertex of a vertex ݒ such thatݒ ് ݑ. 
Then neighbourhood-pair attack is denoted as ܰܲ ൌ ሾܰܥ௩ǡ ܰܥ௨ሿ where ܰܥ௩ is 
neighbourhood coefficient of vertex ݒ.  
 Vertex mapping query using neighbourhood-pair information may returns 
multiple candidate vertices satisfying the pair requirement. However, when the number of 
candidate vertices from the query output is unique, then the target is considered as re-
identified with 100% probability. Therefore, to achieve privacy preservation, we define 
݇-komuniti anonymity as follows: 
DEFINITION 5.2: k-Komuniti Anonymity. A social network  ܩҧ ൌ ሺܸǡ ܧതሻ is ݇-komuniti 
anonymous if for every vertex ݒ א ܸ with edge connection to its neighbours ߚ,  there 
exist at least k vertices with similar degree property to have connection to its neighbours 
such that its neighbours are also have similar degree properties to ߚ where ͳ ൒ ߚ ൑ ȁߚȁ. 
 An adversary with the information ܰܲ ൌ ݊݌ሺܰܥଵǡ ܰܥଶሻ can launch multiple 
types of attack in conjunction to neighbourhood-pair attack. For example he/she could 
also performs degree attack, and neighbourhood attack to identify a vertex corresponding 
to target ݐ. However, ݇-komuniti anonymity also satisfies the following properties of 
anonymity: 
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PROPOSITION 1. If a graph ܩҧ is ݇-komuniti anonymous, ܩҧ is also ݇-degree 
anonymous. 
PROPOSITION 2. If a graph ܩҧ is ݇-komuniti anonymous, ܩ is also ݇-neighbourhood 
anonymous. 
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Fig. 5.1 (a) original graph ܩ (b) ݇-komuniti anonymous ܩҧ. 
 Figure 5.1 shows two social graphs which the graph (a) satisfies ݇-degree and ݇-
neighbourhood anonymity and social graph (b) is a version that satisfies ݇-komuniti 
anonymity. Both social graphs have ten vertices. If we look at the graph (a) in Fig. 5.1,  
for degree attack ܦ ൌ ݀ሺݔሻ where ݔ is the number of direct neighbours, ܦ ൌ ݀ሺͳሻ gives 
candidates of ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܪǡ ܫǡ ܭሽ, ܦ ൌ ݀ሺʹሻ gives ሼ׎ሽ and ܦ ൌ ݀ሺ͵ሻ gives ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ. This 
shoes that Fig. 5.1(a) satisfies ݇-degree anonymous with݇ ൌ ͷ.  
 For neighbourhood attackܰ ൌ ݊ሺݔǡ ߝሻ, ݔis the number of direct neighbours and ߝ 
is the number of edges among ݔ neighbours. Thus, ܰ ൌ ݊ሺ͵ǡ ͳሻ means vertices with 3 
direct neighbours and 1 edge link among those neighbours. ܰ ൌ ݊ሺ͵ǡ ͳሻis equivalent to 
ܰܥሺ͵Ǥͳͳʹሻ where ܰܥሺ߱ሻ is the neighbouhood coefficient. Please note that the 
calculation of ߱ is presented in Chapter 4.  For Fig. 5.1(a), ܰ ൌ ݊ሺ͵ǡ ͳሻ gives candidates 
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ofሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨሽ, ܰ ൌ ݊ሺ͵ǡͲሻ gives candidates ofሼܩǡ ܬሽ. Therefore, the social graph satisfies 
݇-neighbouhood anonymity with݇ ൌ ʹ. Note that vertices with single neighbor, e.g, 
ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܪǡ ܫǡ ܭሽ do not have neighbourhood property. TABLE 5.1 gives the full result 
candidates of the re-identification attack for graph for the graphs in Fig. 5.1. 
 
TABLE 5.1 Query parameters and output candidates. 
Re-identification 
Attack Model Query Parameter 
Query Output (Candidates) 
Social graph (a) Social graph (b) 
Degree Attack ݀ሺͳሻ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܪǡ ܫǡ ܭሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ 
“ ݀ሺ͵ሻ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ. ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬǡ ܭሽ 
Neighbourhood Attack ݊ሺ͵ǡ Ͳሻ ሼܩǡ ܬሽ - 
“ ݊ሺ͵ǡ ͳሻ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨሽ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬǡ ܭሽ 
Neighbourhood-pair 
Attack ܰܲሺͳǤͲͲͲǡ ͵ǤͲͲͲሻ ሼܪǡ ܫǡ ܭሽ - 
“ ܰܲሺ͵ǤͲͲͲǡ ͳǤͲͲͲሻ ሼܩǡ ܬሽ - 
“ ܰܲሺͳǤͲͲͲǡ ͵Ǥͳͳʹሻ ሼܣǡ ܦሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ 
“ ܰܲሺ͵Ǥͳͳʹǡ ͳǤͲͲͲሻ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܬǡ ܭሽ 
“ ܰܲሺ͵Ǥͳͳʹǡ ͵Ǥͳͳʹሻ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨሽ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬǡ ܭሽ 
“ ܰܲሺ͵ǤͲͲͲǡ ͵Ǥͳͳʹሻ ሼܩሽ - 
“ ܰܲሺ͵Ǥͳͳʹǡ ͵ǤͲͲͲሻ ሼܨሽ - 
“ ܰܲሺ͵ǤͲͲͲǡ ͵ǤͲͲͲሻ ሼܩǡ ܬሽ - 
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For neighbourhood-pair attack ܰܲ ൌ ݊݌ሺܰܥଵǡ ܰܥଶሻ where ܰܥଵ is the 
neighbourhood coefficient of the targeted vertex and ܰܥଶ is the neighbourbood 
coefficient of one of the target’s direct neighbor, ܰܲ ൌ ݊݌ሺͳǤͲͲͲǡ ͵ǤͲͲͲሻ gives 
candidates ofሼܪǡ ܫǡ ܭሽ, ܰܲ ൌ ݊݌ሺͳǤͲͲͲǡ ͵Ǥͳͳʹሻ gives candidates of ሼܣǡ ܦሽ and ܰܲ ൌ
݊݌ሺ͵ǤͲͲͲǡ ͳǤͲͲͲሻ gives candidatesሼܩǡ ܬሽ. In contrast, ܰܲ ൌ ݊݌ሺ͵Ǥͳͳʹǡ ͵ǤͲͲͲሻ and 
ܰܲ ൌ ݊݌ሺ͵ǤͲͲͲǡ ͵Ǥͳͳʹሻreturns candidates of ሼܨሽ and ሼܩሽ respectfully. This uniqueness 
exposes vertex ሼܨሽ and ሼܩሽ to be identified by neighbourhood-pair attack. Fig. 5(b) gives 
the ݇-komuniti anonymous version of graph (a). Note that ݇-komuniti anonymity allows 
some ݇ pairs in the proposed solution might shares some common vertices. Therefore, the 
solution does not guarantee that at least ݇ vertices will be provided for each pair 
inሺܰܥଵǡܰܥଶሻ. However, it is compulsory to have ݇ vertices forܰܥଵ. 
 While ݇-komuniti is our main objective, we also need to control the distortion 
resulted from the transformation. We would like to have the published graph ܩҧ to 
maintain the characteristics of the original graph ܩ so that it may be useful for data 
analysis. Therefore, we allow only edge addition and deletion operations and we maintain 
the vertex set in ܩ, i.e., തܸ ൌ ܸ. This helps to prevent the addition or removal of any 
individual so that all possible leaders, influential vertices, and bridge vertices remain. 
For the cost of edge additions and deletions during anonymization process, we calculate 
the graph distance between ܩ andܩഥ , which is defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 5.3: Graph Distance. The distance between ܩ and ܩҧ is given by ܩܦሺܩǡ ܩҧሻ 
= ȁሺܧሺܩሻ ׫ ܧሺܩҧሻȁ െ ȁܧሺܩሻ ת ܧሺܩҧሻȁ. 
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 Based on the given observation, we define the anonymization problem considered 
in this chapter as follows: 
DEFINITION 5.4: Problem Statement. Given ܩas the original graph and positive 
integer݇, the problem is to derive graph ܩҧ fromܩ by edge addition and edge deletion 
such that ܩܦሺܩǡ ܩҧሻ is minimized, ȁ തܸ ȁ ൌ ȁܸȁ, and ܩഥ ሺܸǡ ܧതሻis k-Komuniti anonymous. 
5.3 ࢑-Komuniti Anonymity 
 In this section, we propose our method to transform ܩto ܩҧ that satisfies ݇-
komuniti anonymity. First, the algorithm clusters vertices by degree and set the target 
degree for each cluster to ensure that each cluster contains at least ݇ vertices. Then we 
extract the neighbourhood information by calculating the connection among the 
neighbours of the vertices in the cluster. Edge addition and deletion is performed 
necessarily to ensure each cluster contains at least k vertices with similar neighbourhood 
information. Finally we adjusts the edges between clusters to ensure that, for every pair 
of clusters൫׋௫ǡ ׋௬൯, the edge that connects between vertices in ׋௫ and ׋௬ is either zero or 
not less than݇. The detail of the process is explained below. 
5.3.1 Degree Clustering and Anonymization 
 This step aims to get at least ݇ vertices in each cluster.  The step constructs a 
degree sequence ݀௩ of all vertices inܩ. We assume the sequence is in decreasing order of 
the degrees, i.e.݀௩೔ ൒ ݀௩ೕ݂݋ݎ׊݅ ൑ ݆. Starting from the highest degree, i.e. 
ሺ݀௩ሻ ǡ ݒ א ܸ, we would like to have at least ݇ vertices with selected degree ݀, i.e. 
ȁ݀௩ȁ ൒ ݇. Most of the time, not all clusters will get at least ݇ vertices members. This is 
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commonly happens to the clusters with higher degree property because of the power law 
characteristic of social graph. If there are less than ݇ vertices with degree݀, the algorithm 
will take the component members from other clusters. To achieve that, the edge addition 
and deletion perturbation strategy will be performed necessarily to ensure cluster ܥ 
contains ݇ vertices with degree݀. To decide between edge addition and edge deletion 
perturbation strategy, we need to evaluate which strategy gives less number of changes. 
Given ׋௝ as the subject cluster with degree݀, the target degree is selected using the 
following formula: 
݈݀݁ܤܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ିଵሻ൯ ൌ ൫݀ሺ׋௝ሻ െ ݀ሺ׋௝ିଵሻ൯ כ ห׋௝ห             (5.1) 
 
݈݀݁ܨܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ሻ൯ ൌ ቊ
σ ൫݀ሺ׋௝ା௜ሻ െ ݀ሺ׋௝ሻ൯ כ ሺ݇ െ௝ஸ௜ழ௡ ห׋௝หሻǡห׋௝ା௜ห ൐ ሺ݇ െ ห׋௝หሻ
σ ൫݀ሺ׋௝ା௜ሻ െ ݀ሺ׋௝ሻ൯ כ ห׋௝ା௜ห௝ஸ௜ழ௡ ǡห׋௝ା௜ห ൏ ሺ݇ െ ห׋௝หሻ
 (5.2) 
 
ܽ݀݀ܨܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ାଵሻ൯ ൌ ൫݀ሺ׋௝ାଵሻ െ ݀ሺ׋௝ሻ൯ כ ห׋௝ห               (5.3) 
 
ܽ݀݀ܤܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ሻ൯ ൌ ቐ
σ ቀ݀൫׋௝൯ െ ݀൫׋௝ି௜൯ቁ כ ሺ݇ െ௝ஹ௜வ଴ ห׋௝หሻǡ  ห׋௝ି௜ሻห ൐ ሺ݇ െ ׋௝ሻ
σ ቀ݀൫׋௝൯ െ ݀൫׋௝ି௜൯ቁ כ௝ஹ௜வ଴ ห׋௝ି௜หǡ  ห׋௝ି௜ሻห ൏ ሺ݇ െ ׋௝ሻ
 
 (5.4) 
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where ݀ is the degree property, ׋௝ is the subject cluster  and k is the target number of 
cluster members. Formula (5.1) evaluates the cost of reducing the degree of all members 
in the subject cluster׋௝ to move its vertex members to cluster ݀ሺ׋௝ିଵሻ by edge deletion. 
The cost of this option is calculated by the difference of the degree between both clusters 
multiplied by the total members of source cluster e.g. ห׋௝ห. Formula (5.2) evaluates the 
cost for getting the component members from the cluster of bigger degree than׋௝. In this 
case, ݀ሺ׋௝ሻ is the target degree and the cost is calculated by the degree difference 
between cluster ׋௝ା௜ and ׋௝multiplied by the required amount of vertices. If cluster ׋௝ା௜ 
has vertices member of less than the required amount, all members in cluster ׋௝ା௜ are 
moved to ׋௝ by edge deletion. Formula (5.3) and (5.4) are for edge addition where in 
formula (5.3), ݀ሺ׋௝ାଵሻ is the target degree where all vertex members in ׋௝ will have edge 
addition until the degree property of each vertices reaches݀ሺ׋௝ାଵሻ. Formula (5.4) 
evaluates the case when ݀൫׋௝൯ is the target degree. It calculates the cost of edge addition 
if getting vertex components from ׋௝ି௜. If cluster ׋௝ି௜൐ ሺ݇ െ ห׋௝หሻ is not hold, then all 
the vertex components of ׋௝ି௜ will be moved to ׋௝ by edge addition. To decide either any 
particular step needs edge addition or deletion, we derived the cost of edge addition and 
deletion with dynamic programming as follows: 
 
 ݌݁ݎݐݑݎܾܥ݋ݏݐሺ׋௝ሻ ൌ ݉݅݊ ቊ
݉݅݊൛݈݀݁ܤܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ିଵሻ൯ǡ݈݀݁ܨܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ሻ൯ൟ
݉݅݊൛ܽ݀݀ܨܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ାଵሻ൯ǡܽ݀݀ܤܥ݋ݏݐ൫݀ሺ׋௝ሻ൯ൟ
 (5.5) 
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where ׋௝ is the subject cluster in question, ׋௝ିଵ is the clusters with degree of smaller than 
׋௝ and ׋௝ାଵሻ is the clusters with degree of larger than ׋௝. Formula (5.5) decides which 
cluster is going to be the target and which cluster to be the source. Edge addition strategy 
is used when the target cluster has greater degree property than the source where edge 
deletion strategy is used when the target is smaller than the source.     
Example 5.1. Fig. 5.2 illustrates an example of degree clustering and anonymization 
step. Graph (a) shows a cluster with two vertices ܦ and ܬ with degree ͵ and ͷ 
respectively in a cluster. Assume that vertex ܬ is the correct vertex for the cluster and 
vertex  ܦ has the closest degree to vertex ܬ so they are grouped together in the same 
cluster. Since both vertices have unequal degree property, edge perturbation is needed to 
make them equal in terms of degree property. Graph (b) shows the degree anonymization 
step where new edge ሼܦǡ ܧሽ is added and existing edge ሼܧǡ ܬሽ is deleted so that vertices ܦ 
and ܬ have similar degree property.  
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Fig. 5.2 (a) Degree clustering (b) Degree anonymization (c) Neighbourhood alignment. 
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5.3.2 Neighbourhood Alignment and Pairing 
 In this step, we would like to ensure the ݇ vertices similar degree in the previous 
step also shares similar neighbourhood characteristic. We extract neighborhoods of 
vertices and represent them in a special form. To extract neighbourhood information, we 
first get the vertices that connect directly toݒ. Assume ݑ as the vertices that are 
connected directly toݒ. We then calculate the number of links that exist between ݑ௞and 
ݑ௟. Assume ݁ሺݑ௞ǡݑ௟ሻ as the link exist between ݑ௞ andݑ௟, then the total number of link is 
given by ห݁ሺݑ௞ǡݑ௟ሻห. Thus, we represent the neighbourhood of vertex ݒ in the following 
form: 
݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݑݎ݄݋݋݀௩ ൌ ሾ݀ሺݒሻǡ ߠ௩ሿ    (5.6) 
where ݀ሺݒሻis the degree property of vertex ݒ and ߠ௩ is the total number of link exist 
between ݑ௞ and ݑ௟, e.g. ห݁ሺݑ௞ǡݑ௟ሻห. Having the neighbourhood information for all vertex 
components in the subject cluster, this step finally ensures that all ݒ in the subject cluster 
has similar ߠ value so that the cluster will have ݇ vertices with similar neighbourhood. 
Two vertices are perfectly matched each other if they have the same degree and the same 
ߠ value. To achieve that, edge addition and deletion is performed necessarily until all ݇ 
vertices have similar neighbourhood property. 
DEFINITION 5.2: Neighbourhood Aligment. Given a set of vertices ሼݒଵǡ ݒଶǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݒ௡ሽ in 
cluster ׋ where ȁݒȁ א ׋൒ ݇ and all ݒ are isomorphic to each other with respect to 
ሾ݀ሺݒሻǡ ߠ௩ሿ. Due to isomorphism, given any vertex in cluster׋, there must exist ݇ other 
symmetric vertices with respect toሾ݀ሺݒሻǡ ߠ௩ሿ. 
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Example 5.2. Fig. 5.2(c) illustrates an example of neighbourhood alignment step. 
Consider two vertices ܦ and ܬ are in the same cluster with equal degree properties 
e.g.݀ሺܦሻ ൌ ݀ሺܬሻ ൌ Ͷ. Among all the neighbouring vertices of vertex D, two of them are 
connected which is betweenሼܣǡ ܤሽ. We denote this as ݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݑݎ݄݋݋݀஽ ൌ ሾͶǡͳሿ. The 
other vertex ܬ has݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݑݎ݄݋݋݀௃ ൌ ሾͶǡͲሿ. To ensure neighbourhood anonymity, edge 
addition is performed so that vertex ܬ also has two of its neighbor connected e.g. 
݄ܾ݊݁݅݃݋ݑݎ݄݋݋݀௃ ൌ ሾͶǡͳሿ. Thus, the neighborhood of vertex ܦ and ܬ in the cluster are 
perfectly matched. 
Finally, we check the connection among the clusters to ensure that for every pair 
of clusters൛׋௝ǡ ׋௟ൟ, the number of vertices in ׋௝with edges connecting to the vertices in ׋௟ 
must be at least ݇ or zero connection at all. Thus, edge addition or deletion is performed 
necessarily to ensure that cluster ׋௝ and ׋௟ have sufficient edges between them. We 
devise the following conditions to decide either edge deletion or addition: 1) for each pair 
of clusters ׋௝ and׋௟, if the amount of edge connecting them is less than݇Ȁʹ, than edge 
deletion is performed until there is no edge between ׋௝ and׋௟. If it is not that case, we 
add new edges between clusters ׋௝ and ׋௟ by connecting vertex ݒ in ׋௝ and vertex ݑ in ׋௟ 
under the following conditions: 1) vertex ݒ does not connect to any vertex in cluster׋௟; 
2) vertex ݒ connects to the vertices with the smaller degrees in cluster ׋௝ିଵ where cluster  
׋௝ିଵ has yet been processed for neighbourhood pairing. By these conditions, the 
algorithm avoids choosing unnecessary vertices. The abstract algorithm for the processes 
is given next.  
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Algorithm 5.1 ܭ-komuniti Algorithm 
Input:ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻǡ ݇ 
Output:ܩҧ 
1. ׋՚  cluster all ݒ in ܩ by vertex degree 
2. FOR ݅ ൌ each ׋ 
3.     IF ȁ׋௜ȁ ൏ ݇ 
4.        get vertex with closest degree  
5.         anonymize ׋௜ with edge addition or deletion to selected degree                
6.     END IF 
7.      extract neighbourhood of ׋௜ 
8.      align the neighbourhood of each vertex component in  ׋௜.   
9. END FOR 
10. Perform neighbourhood pairing 
11. return ܩҧ 
 
Algorithm 5.1 takes a social network graph ܩ and ݇ value as inputs and returns 
anonymized graphܩഥ . In Line 1, the graph is first clustered by vertex degree so that all 
vertices with similar degree property are grouped together. Then in Line 3 to 6, the 
algorithm anonymizes the clusters that have less than k members. This is done by 
descending manner which starts from the cluster of highest degree property. Having the 
cluster to contain at least k members, the algorithm extracts all connection among the 
direct neighbours of all the vertex components (Line 7) and ensure that all vertex 
components in the subject cluster have similar neighbourhood property. To achieve that, 
edge addition and deletion is performed necessarily. 
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Algorithm 5.2 Edge Perturbation Algorithm 
Input:ܩǡ ׋ǡ ݇ 
Output:ܩҧ 
1. FOR ݅ ൌ each cluster in ׋ 
2.     ߛ ՚ ሺȁ׋௜ȁ ൏ ݇). 
3. END FOR 
4. FOR ݆ ൌ each element in ߛ 
5.     ሼݏǡ ݐሽ ՚find lowest cost for edge perturbation of ߛ௝; 
6.     IF ݐ > ݏ THEN 
7.         Add edge; 
8.     ELSE 
9.         Delete edge;     
10.     END IF 
11. END WHILE 
12. return ܩҧ 
 
 
The algorithm takes a social network graphܩ, super cluster ׋ and ݇ value as 
inputs and returns anonymized graphܩഥ . In Line 1 to 3, the algorithm separates the 
clusters that have less than݇ members. Having ߛ as a list of cluster with member less 
than݇ǡ the algorithm then processes each of the elements in ߛ starting from the cluster 
with members of highest degree. The first step is to calculate the edge cost to get the 
incident elementߛ௝ to achieve ݇ with minimum edge change. This step is detailed in 
Algorithm 5.3. The output for this step is to get the source and target degree. If the target 
degree is greater than source degree, it means edge addition strategy is needed to make 
the incident cluster to achieve݇. Otherwise, edge deletion will be performed. These step 
will be performed until all clusters in ߛ contains ݇ members.  Lastly, the algorithm 
returns the updatedܩҧ. 
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Algorithm 5.3 Calculate Cluster Difference 
Input:ߛ௝ǡ ׋ 
Output:ݏ, ݐ 
1. ݐ݋ܭ ൌ ݇ െ หߛ௝ห. 
2. ܾܽܿ݇ܦ݈݁ܦ݂݂݅ ՚ หߛ௝ห כ ൫ߛ௝ െ ߛ௝ିଵ൯. 
3. ݂ݎ݋݊ݐܣ݀݀ܦ݂݂݅ ՚ หߛ௝ห כ ൫ߛ௝ାଵ െ ߛ௝൯. 
4. IF หߛ௝ିଵห ൐ ݐ݋ܭ 
5.     ܾܽܿ݇ܣ݀݀ܦ݂݂݅ ՚ ൣߛ௝ െ ߛ௝ିଵ൧ כ ݐ݋ܭ. 
6. ELSE 
7.     ܾܽܿ݇ܣ݀݀ܦ݂݂݅ ՚ ൣߛ௝ െ ߛ௝ିଵ൧ כ หߛ௝ିଵห. 
8. END IF 
9. IF หߛ௝ାଵห ൐ ݐ݋ܭ 
10.     ݂ݎ݋݊ݐܦ݈݁ܦ݂݂݅ ՚ ൣߛ௝ାଵെߛ௝൧ כ ݐ݋ܭ. 
11. ELSE 
12.     ݂ݎ݋݊ݐܦ݈݁ܦ݂݂݅ ՚ ൣߛ௝ାଵെߛ௝൧ כ หߛ௝ାଵห. 
13. END IF 
14. ሼܾܽܿ݇ܦ݈݁ܦ݂݂݅ǡ ݂ݎ݋݊ݐܣ݀݀ܦ݂݂݅ǡ ܾܽܿ݇ܣ݀݀ܦ݂݂݅ǡ ݂ݎ݋݊ݐܦ݈݁ܦ݂݂݅ሽ. 
15. IF ݉݅݊ ൌ ܾܽܿ݇ܦ݈݁ܦ݂݂݅ 
16.     ݏ ൌ ߛ௝ǡ ݐ ൌ ߛ௝ିଵ. 
17. ELSEIF ݉݅݊ ൌ ܾܽܿ݇ܣ݀݀ܦ݂݂݅ 
18.     ݏ ൌ ߛ௝ିଵǡ ݐ ൌ ߛ௝ 
19. ELSEIF݉݅݊ ൌ ݂ݎ݋݊ݐܦ݈݁ܦ݂݂݅ 
20.     ݏ ൌ ߛ௝ାଵǡ ݐ ൌ ߛ௝ 
21. ELSEIF݉݅݊ ൌ ݂ݎ݋݊ݐܣ݀݀ܦ݂݂݅ 
22.     ݏ ൌ ߛ௝ǡ ݐ ൌ ߛ௝ିଵ 
23. END IF 
24. return ሼݏǡ ݐሽ 
 
 
Algorithm 5.3 takes the incident element of ߛ௝ and super set cluster ׋ as inputs 
and returns variables ݏ andݐ Variable ݏ is the particular cluster that its vertex members 
will have edge perturbation in order to move some or all its members to the target cluster 
ݐ so that the target cluster will achieve ݇ members. In Line 1, the algorithm calculates the 
required members that cluster ߛ௝needs in order to achieve k. Line 2 to 13 are the steps to 
control the amount of edge perturbation in anonymization. These calculation steps are 
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divided into two phases. The first phase is to calculate the cost of edge change when 
moving all members of ߛ௝ to ߛ௝ିଵ and toߛ௝ାଵ (Line 2 and 3). The second phase consists 
the steps for calculating the cost for moving members from cluster ߛ௝ିଵ and toߛ௝ାଵ toߛ௝  
Note that ߛ௝ିଵ and to ߛ௝ାଵ are the nearest clusters to ߛ௝ where ߛ௝ିଵ is the closest cluster 
with degree smaller than ߛ௝ and ߛ௝ାଵ is the closest cluster with degree larger thanߛ௝. The 
perturbation cost is calculated by multiplying the degree difference between clusters 
൫ߛ௝ െ ߛ௝ିଵ൯ and ൫ߛ௝ െ ߛ௝ାଵ൯ times the total member of ߛ௝ cluster denoted asหߛ௝ห. In Line 
14, the algorithm chooses the smallest value from all four results. Line 15 to 23 assigns 
the source and target cluster from the calculation.  
5.4 Result and Discussion 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. Given our 
approach requires more perturbation than the baseline, we want to investigate the 
deviations of the dataset utility using the given analysis metric. We compare our 
approach to the original unmodified graph and also to the ݇-degree anonymized graph.   
5.4.1 Average Betweeness Measurement 
Figures 7(b), 8(b) and 9(b) show the average betweeness metric of the 
anonymized datasets as a function of݇, respectively. This is the frequency of a vertex 
having the shortest paths between pairs of vertices. The dashed line represents the 
average betweeness values of the original graphs, which does not change over different 
value of݇. Here we observe that the betweeness values have similar trends (with respect 
to the original value) where the values deviate from the original line in descending order. 
In Figure 5.3(a), 5.3(b) and 5.3(c), the average betweeness values of the graph 
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anonymized by the neighbourhood-pair approach deviate from the original betweeness 
value more than the degree anonymization approach. The minimal difference between 
both approaches is shown in random graph. This is expected because the neighbourhood-
pair method involves more edge perturbation than the degree approach in order to 
achieve better anonymization. 
 
(a)       (b)         (c) 
Fig. 5.3 Average Betweeness for (a) PolBook (b) Scale-Free (c) Random graphs 
5.4.2 Average Shortest Path Lengths Measurement 
  Figures 5.4(a), 5.4(a) and 5.4(a) show the average shortest path lengths between 
vertex pairs of the anonymized graph of Polbook, Scale-Free and Random dataset as a 
function of ݇, respectively. The straight dashed lines represent the average path length 
value original graphs, which do not influenced by the value of ݇. The average path length 
of the original unanonymized datasets are 3.0494 (PolBook), 3.4428(Scale-Free) and 
1.4962 (Random). As the value of ݇grows, the average path length deviates in 
decreasing trend from the original value. This indicates that edge addition strategy was 
mostly imposed by the algorithm rather than edge deletion. The path length will changed 
according to the type of perturbation. The addition of new edges will eventually shorten  
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(a)       (b)           (c) 
Fig. 5.4 Average Shortest Path Length for (a) PolBook (b) Scale-Free (c) Random graphs 
the path length between vertices and vice versa. Degree based anonymization has better 
closer value to the original because the model has fewer amount of edge perturbation. 
However, the proposed method provides more protection at the cost of more edge 
perturbation. 
5.4.3 Clustering Coefficient Measurement 
   Average Clustering Coefficient: Figures 5.5(a), 5.5(b) and 5.5(c) show the 
clustering coefficients of the anonymized datasets as a function of݇, respectively. The 
clustering coefficient value of the original Polbook, Scale Free and Random are about 
0.4875, 0.0880 and 0.4986. Expectedly, the proposed neighbourhood-pair approach has 
affected the utility more than the degree-based anonymization. It is noticed that the scale-
free graph has an opposite line trend where the clustering coefficient values for the 
proposed approach are closer to the original value when ݇ requirement is increased. It is 
yet to determine how such differences impact but the intuitive reason for this is the 
exceed amount of edge additions and deletions process during anonymization introduce  
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(a)                (b)                  (c) 
Fig. 5.5 Clustering Coefficient: for (a) PolBook (b) Scale-Free (c) Random graphs. 
re-establishment of the edge connection among involved vertices. For example, an edge 
connection between vertex ݒ and ݑmay need to be deleted in the beginning step in order 
to fulfill the step requirements. Later on the next step, the particular edge connection is 
probably added back to fulfill that particular stage’s requirements. Since neighbourhood-
pair approach requires more edge change than the degree-based approach, it increases the 
possibilities of this situation in the proposed approach. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we tackled the problem of preserving privacy in social graph 
against neighborhood-pair attacks. We modeled the problem systematically and proposed 
a method to protect from such attack. An empirical study using both real and synthetic 
data sets, and several utility measures indicated that the proposed algorithms can 
effectively protect edge anonymity and can produce anonymized graphs that have 
acceptable utility trading off with higher privacy preservation.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Preserving Relationship Integrity in 
Social Graph Anonymization 
 
Social network data anonymization involves social links modification. This 
process aims to hide potential link structure that could be manipulated by adversaries to 
re-identify targeted individuals and breach their privacy. However, altering the structure 
of the links relationship in social network data provides great challenge to balance 
between the gain of privacy and the loss of information (data utility). In this chapter, we 
address this problem. We propose a new metric that calculates the utility impact in social 
links modification in anonymizing social network data. The metric utilizes the shortest 
path length and the neighbourhood overlaps as utility value. The value is then used as 
weight factor in preserving structural integrity in social graph anonymization. This 
approach guarantees that for any modification made to the social links, the distance 
between vertices stays as close as the original social graph prior modification. 
Experimental evaluation shows that the proposed metric has successfully improved the 
utility preservation compared to the number-of-change metric. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Modifying the network structure to fulfil k-anonymization requirement often 
affects the integrity of the social network data. Moreover, higher k requirement (to gain 
more privacy) often requires more modification to be made to the network. Eventually, 
this is realized with the cost of the utility of the data. Thus, the problem of maintaining 
high data utility while gaining privacy is paramount importance in social network data 
anonymization. By high data utility, we meant that the pure information carried by the 
original social network data is highly preserved. The information that has distorted too 
much from its original will likely produce unreliable analysis outcomes. 
It is very challenging to maintain high utility of the data when modifying the link 
structure of social network. The task has not been mainly regarded in many of previous 
works. A common approach used to controlutility distortion in structural-based 
anonymization is by controlling the amount of changes made to the social graph[19, 37, 
38, 41, 42]. Using this approach, the anonymization algorithm greedily chooses the 
solution with smallest amount of change when perturbing social graph. The aim is to get 
minimum difference between the perturbed graph ܩ෢  and the original graphܩ. It is 
believed that the fewer the changes made to the graph, the smaller the effects on the 
utility. While this is certainly true, this approach does not consider the impacts on the 
social links structure. For example, having several options with equal number of 
minimum edge changes do not necessarily have equal impact on the structural integrity. 
Therefore, we need a mechanism to calculate the structural impact. 
Different approaches were also proposed in the directions of preserving social 
graph utility. Research done by [59] and [57] considers local community structure as 
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subject of utility preservation. In [59], they proposed an approach in which the graph is 
partitioned by local structure. They use multilevel k-way partitioning scheme as a method 
to extract the local structure. Each partition is treated as one single unit to be 
anonymized. Using this approach, they aim to preserve the original communities from the 
original graph. The amount-of-change metric is still subscribed in order to minimize the 
amount of perturbation. On the other hand, the work in [57] proposes a metric called 
‘Hierarchical Community Entropy (HCE)’ to represent the graph community structure. 
The metric is then heuristically used in edge perturbation. The amount-of-change metric 
is also considered to achieve minimum perturbation. Compared to [59] which separates 
each local community, this approach however prefers to bridge every local communities 
in their edge perturbation scheme. 
In this chapter, we propose a metric to represent the impact on structural properties of 
social network data. The metric leverages the shortest path length and the neighbourhood 
overlap to weigh the connection edge that subject to be modified. Based on the weight 
value, the anonymization algorithm then heuristically performs edge perturbation. The 
proposed controlling mechanism guarantees that for any perturbation made to the social 
links, the distance between vertices is as close as the original network. This is beneficial 
in preserving the relative importance of vertices in social network data. In summary, we 
make the following main contributions: 
c. We propose a new metric to determine the impact on structural integrity from 
anonymization operation. 
d. We compare the performance of the proposed approach with the popular existing 
approach. 
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We follow similar route of the works in [57-59], to study generic enhancement approach 
to preserve utility in graph anonymization.  
6.2 Problem Overview 
In this section, we highlight the utility properties that are concerned in this work. 
We then formulate the problem that we address in this chapter. 
Transforming the graph to its structural k-anonymous version requires a series of 
edge perturbation. This will eventually affects the utility of the graph. The perturbation 
needs to be carefully done so that its k-anonymous version would be as near as the 
original graph. Commonly, it is believed that nearest graph maintains high utility. We 
define the nearest graph as follows:   
DEFINITION 4: Nearest Graph. Given ܩ is the graph and ܩ෠ is the perturbed graph. 
Nearest graph means the amount of changes is as small as possible calculated by  
ܰܩ ൌ หܩ෠൫ܸǡ ܧ෠൯ െ ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻหሺͳሻ 
Proposition 1. Achieving nearest graph in social graph perturbation does not always 
guarantee minimum change of graph structural integrity. 
 
Proof.  Let ݒ א ܸ be any vertex, ܷ ൌ ሺݑଵǡ ݑଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݑ௜ሻ א ܸ are a set of vertices that are 
directly connected toݒ and ܰ ൌ ሺ݊ଵǡ ݊ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݊௜ሻ א ܸ are a set of other vertices that are not 
directly connected to ݒ. Assume that by deleting any single edge between ݒ and ݑ௜ and/or 
adding edge between ݒ and ݊௜ hold the requirement of nearest graph which also satisfies 
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k-anonymity. For every option, the change in the length distance of involved vertices 
resulted from the single perturbation (either edge deletion or addition) is not similar. 
Hence, getting nearest k-anonymous graph in terms of amount of change does not 
guarantee minimum change in structural integrity.  
E
H
A
G
D IF
JCB
 
Fig. 6.1 A social graphܩ. 
 
TABLE 6.1 Vertices in ܩ clustered by degree݀. 
Cluster ࢊሺ૝ሻ ࢊሺ૜ሻ ࢊሺ૛ሻ ࢊሺ૚ሻ 
Members ሼܨሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
  
Fig. 6.1 is an example of a simple social graph consisting ten vertices denote as ܩ. 
Assume social graphܩ is released by a medical centre which provides dedicated social 
media platform to their patients for online monitoring and communication. The vertices 
represent real-world individuals. Therefore, disclosing the identity of individuals 
represented in the data will leads to the disclosure of sensitive medical information of the 
individuals. We assume that the user data has been naively anonymized but the structural 
information is unmodified thus we omit the user data. The adversary knows the number 
of friends that the targeted individual has. Consequently, the adversary may query the 
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targeted individual from the social graph by manipulating degree properties denote as݀. 
TABLE 1 clusters the vertices in ܩ according to the degree of each vertex. We set the 
anonymity requirement as ݇ ൌ ʹ which means there must be at least two vertices in 
ܩwith similar degree. It happened that the cluster with ݀ሺͶሻdoes not satisfy the 
requirement of minimum two membersሺ݇ ൌ ʹሻ. Therefore, we need to transform graph ܩ 
to its k-anonymous version according to degree properties which satisfies݇ ൌ ʹ. The 
number of edge to be perturbed in graph ܩ must be kept minimal in order to minimize the 
amount of change. The perturbation could be done by edge deletion or edge addition. The 
examples and issues of both cases are given as follows: 
x CASE 1: Edge Deletion. The unique member in cluster ݀ሺͶሻ can be anonymized by 
deleting an edge that is connected to vertex ܨ leaving only three edges.Eventually, vertexܨ 
will then belong to cluster݀ሺ͵ሻ ൌ. This will satisfy 2-anonymity because the cluster with 
minimal member is݀ሺͳሻ ൌ ݇ ൌ ʹ. As only single edge deletion moves the graph to k-
anonymity, this already satisfies minimal perturbation requirement. However, out of the 
four edges from vertex ܨ, only one edge needs to be deleted. Fig. 6.2 illustrates this 
situation while TABLE 6.2 gives the cluster members resulted from each option. As shown 
in TABLE 6.2, it is possible to randomly delete any edge from vertex F as all options 
could satisfy 2-anonymity to social graphܩ. The issue here is that, the impact on structural 
integrity of each option is ignored. 
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Fig. 6.2 Edge deletion options for ܩ෠. 
 
TABLE 6.2 Cluster members for all edge deletion options. 
Cluster ࢊሺ૝ሻ ࢊሺ૜ሻ ࢊሺ૛ሻ ࢊሺ૚ሻ 
Original ሼܨሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Deletion (edge #1) ሼ׎ሽ ሼܣǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܦǡ ܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Deletion (edge #2) ሼ׎ሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܪሽ 
Deletion (edge #3) ሼ׎ሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܨǡ ܩሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫǡ ܬሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Deletion (edge #4) ሼ׎ሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܨǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪሽ ሼܤǡ ܥǡ ܫሽ 
 
x CASE 2: Edge Addition. For edge addition, we seek to add member to cluster ݀ሺͶሻ so that 
the cluster will contain at least two members and satisfies݇ ൌ ʹ. The choice with the 
nearest output graph is to add an edge to one of the vertices in the cluster݀ሺ͵ሻ compared 
to two edges for cluster ݀ሺʹሻ and three edges for cluster݀ሺͳሻ. When cluster݀ሺͶሻ receives 
new members, it will satisfy ݇requirement.However there are four vertex candidates 
in݀ሺ͵ሻ ൌ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ. Now there are two problems; first, we need to choose which vertex 
in ݀ሺ͵ሻto add an edge to move it to݀ሺͶሻ, second, we need also to concern about the other 
vertex that the edge will connect to. For instance, if we connect a vertex from cluster݀ሺ͵ሻ 
to a vertex in cluster݀ሺͳሻ, the chosen vertex in ݀ሺ͵ሻwill then belong to cluster ݀ሺͶሻ and a 
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member in cluster݀ሺͳሻ will move to cluster݀ሺʹሻ. Consequently, this will makeȁ݀ሺͳሻȁ ൏
݇. It seems not reasonable to make one vertex to gain privacy while compromising other 
vertex’s privacy. The better option in this particular case is to add an edge from a vertex in 
݀ሺ͵ሻ to a vertex in ݀ሺʹሻ or݀ሺ͵ሻ. This will satisfy ݇ ൌ ʹ requirement with only single 
edge addition. However, there are plenty options with single edge addition. For connecting 
an edge from a vertex in ݀ሺ͵ሻ to a vertex in݀ሺʹሻ, there are eight choices and connecting 
an edge from a vertex in ݀ሺ͵ሻ to a vertex in ݀ሺ͵ሻ, there are four choices. Fig. 6.3 
illustrates the possibilities. Figure 6.3(a) is for ݒ א ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎሺ݀ሺ͵ሻ ׫ ݑ א ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎሺ݀ሺʹሻand 
Figure 6.3(b) is for ݒ א ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎሺ݀ሺ͵ሻ ׫ ݑ א ݈ܿݑݏݐ݁ݎሺ݀ሺ͵ሻ whereݒ ് ݑ. Indeed, each 
option will give different impact to the structural integrity. 
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Fig.6.3 Options for single edge addition from a) ݀ሺ͵ሻ to ݀ሺʹሻ and b) ݀ሺ͵ሻ to ݀ሺ͵ሻ 
 
TABLE 6.3 Options for single edge addition from ݀ሺ͵ሻto݀ሺʹሻ. 
Cluster ࢊሺ૝ሻ ࢊሺ૜ሻ ࢊሺ૛ሻ ࢊሺ૚ሻ 
Original ሼܨሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #1) ሼܨǡ ܣሽ ሼܦǡ ܩǡ ܫǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #2) ሼܨǡ ܣሽ ሼܦǡ ܩǡ ܪǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
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Addition (edge #3) ሼܨǡ ܣሽ ሼܦǡ ܧǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #4) ሼܨǡ ܦሽ ሼܣǡ ܩǡ ܪǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #5) ሼܨǡ ܦሽ ሼܣǡ ܩǡ ܫǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #6) ሼܨǡ ܩሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܫǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #7) ሼܨǡ ܬሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܩǡ ܪሽ ሼܧǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #8) ሼܨǡ ܬሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܧǡ ܩሽ ሼܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
 
TABLE 6.4 Options for single edge addition from ݀ሺ͵ሻto ݀ሺ͵ሻ. 
Cluster ࢊሺ૝ሻ ࢊሺ૜ሻ ࢊሺ૛ሻ ࢊሺ૚ሻ 
Original ሼܨሽ ሼܣǡ ܦǡ ܩǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #1) ሼܨǡ ܣǡ ܩሽ ሼܦǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #2) ሼܨǡ ܣǡ ܬሽ ሼܦǡ ܩሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #3) ሼܨǡ ܦǡ ܩሽ ሼܣǡ ܬሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
Addition (edge #4) ሼܨǡ ܦǡ ܬሽ ሼܣǡ ܩሽ ሼܧǡ ܪǡ ܫሽ ሼܤǡ ܥሽ 
 
From the cases given, it is shown that minimizing the amount of changes alone 
fails to define a meaningful impact on each of the similar option. There exist multiple 
choices of perturbation with the same minimal amount of perturbation. Therefore, this 
paper is set to address this problem. Formally, the problem is expressed as follows:  
DEFINITION 5: Problem Statement. Given ܩas the original graph,ܷሺܩሻ is the 
utilityܷofgraphܩ,the k-anonymity privacy model ܪand the privacy requirement݇, derive 
graph ܩ෠ fromܩ by edge addition and edge deletion such that: 
(i) ܩ෠൫ܸǡ ܧ෠൯is k-anonymous by anonymization model ܪ, 
(ii)  ሺหܩ෠൫ܸǡ ܧ෠൯ െ ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻหሻ is minimized 
(iii) ܷሺܩሻ െ ܷ൫ܩ෠൯ is minimized where  
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x the difference betweenܵܲܮሺܩሻ෢  and ܵܲܮሺܩሻ is minimized 
x the difference between ܱܰሺܩሻ෢  and ܱܰሺܩሻ is minimized  
  
Our aim is to transform graphܩ to graph ܩ෠ which satisfies the defined 
requirements. The first requirement is to ensure the perturbed graph complies k-
anonymity principle. Second requirement states that the perturbed graph shall be as near 
as the original social graph as defined in DEFINITION 4.Therefore the amount-of-
change metric is still considered in this work. The metric is important for minimizing the 
amount of perturbation to achieve nearest graph. The third requirement states that the 
utility of anonymized social graph shall be as closed as the utility of original graph in 
terms of i) the change in relative distance between vertices is minimized ii) the change in 
relationship strength between vertices. We define and describe the utility meant in this 
paper as follows: 
DEFINITION 6: Shortest Path Length (SPL). A path ܲ in ܩ is a sequence of vertices 
ܲ ൌ ሺݒଵǡ ݒଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݒ௡ሻ such that ݒ௜ is adjacent to ݒ௜ାଵfor ͳ ൑ ݅ ൏ ݊ such the length of path 
from ݒ௜to ݒ௡ is݊ െ ͳ. Given all possible paths from ݒ௜to ݒ௡, shortest path length is the 
minimum path length denoted byܵܲܮሺݒ௜ǡ ݒ௡ሻ. 
 The first topological utility that is concerned is distance-based utility. Given the 
fact that social network is a complex graph, there are many aspects of topological 
properties, such as the average path length, network diameter, betweenness, and 
closeness. Average path length computes the average number of shortest paths between 
all possible pairs of vertices in a network. Diameter is calculated by the maximum 
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shortest path in the network. Betweenness represents proportion of shortest paths that 
pass through a vertex whereas closeness is the average distance of a vertex to all other 
vertex in the graph. Indeed, all these measurements are stem from the shortest path length 
between vertices. Consequently, we decide to leverage the shortest path length in order to 
minimize the distance change between vertices in the anonymized graph. 
 The second topological utility that is concerned is community-based utility. The 
strength of the relationship between vertices in a local community is considered. When 
measuring the relationship strength of two vertices, the total neighbours of both vertices 
implies the number of alternative path that possibly exist between both vertices. We look 
at the number of overlapping neighbours between two subject vertices. When two 
vertices share some neighbours, the overlapping neighbours implies the strength of the 
relationship between those vertices. The more the overlaps, the stronger are the 
relationship among vertices in the neighbourhood. The Neighbourhood Overlap metric 
[64] is defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 7: Neighborhood Overlap (NO). Given two vertices ݒ and ݑ that have 
path available to each other. The neighbourhood overlap ܱܰሺݒǡ ݑሻ between vertex ݒ and 
ݑ is defined as follow 
ܱܰሺݒǡ ݑሻ ൌ  ߱ ൅ ȁܸሺݒሻ ת ܸሺݑሻȁ߱ ൅ ȁܸሺݒሻ ׫ ܸሺݑሻȁሺʹሻ 
where߱ is the weight defined by user, ܸሺݒሻ is the neighbouring vertices of vertex ݒ and 
ܸሺݑሻ is the neighbouring vertices of vertex ݑ. Literally, the numerator is the number of 
direct neighbour to vertex ݒ and ݑ which overlaps. The denominator takes the total 
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number of direct neighbours that both vertices have. In the best case, vertex ݒ and ݑ have 
an equal number of direct neighbours and share all direct neighbours they have with each 
other. Having this, the NO value will be 1. Note that the overlapping neighbours between 
a pair of vertices probably none existence. Therefore, the weight ߱ is used to avoid the 
return result becoming zero. Having this weight on the numerator, the denominator is 
also weighted with the same value. Here, we assume that both vertices are connected. 
6.3 Utility Preserving Magnitude 
In this section, we present the new metric to quantify the utility. The metric utilize 
distance-based and community-based properties that have been defined in the previous 
chapter. We then demonstrate a case to show how theoretically the metric would improve 
graph utility preservation. 
 When an edge between two vertices is added or deleted, it will result in the 
change of the distance between the involved vertices. In the case of edge deletion, the 
path between vertices will become longer after deletion. Contrarily, the path between 
vertices will become shorter after edge addition. Therefore, the edge perturbation needs 
to consider minimal change in terms of the distance between involved vertices. Given the 
Shortest Path Length defined in DEFINITION 6, we calculate the Shortest Path 
Difference (SPD) which is defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 8: Shortest Path Difference. Given ܩ෠ሺܸǡ ܧ෠ሻ as the perturbed version of 
ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ, the shortest path difference is the difference between ܵܲܮሺݒ௜ǡ ݒ௡ሻ א ܩ and 
ܵܲܮሺݒො௜ǡ ݒො௡ሻ א ܩ෠ calculated by ܵܲܦሺݒǡ ݑሻ ൌ ȁܵܲܮሺݒǡ ݑሻ െ ܵܲܮሺݒොǡ ݑොሻȁ where ܵܲܮሺݒǡ ݑሻ is 
shortest path length defined in 5.2.2. 
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 Shortest Path Difference (SPD) evaluates the effects of the perturbation in terms 
of the distance between involved vertices. The strategy to apply SPD is different for edge 
deletion and edge addition task. In the case of edge deletion, the shortest path length 
between two vertices is always 1 since they are directly connected. To know the distance 
if the edge is deleted, the second shortest path of the pair needs to be calculated. The 
second shortest path reflects the distance after the edge has been deleted without actually 
delete the edge. After that, the SPD metric is calculated. This applied to all available edge 
options for each step. Eventually, the edge with the smallest SPD will be chosen to be 
deleted.  
 Shortest Path Difference (SPD) differentiates among edge perturbation choices by 
measuring the change in distance between the involved vertices. However, it is possible 
that the output is not unique where more than one options share the same SPD scores. In 
order to address this issue, we employ Neighbourhood Overlap (NO) to measure the 
connection strength of the involved vertices in local community. Note that we do not 
intend to find community structures in the graph but to measure whether the involved 
vertices are in the same community.  
 To get the full advantage of both utilities, we combined the Shortest-Path-
Difference metric and Neighborhood-Overlap metric by taking the reciprocal of the sum 
of both metric values. We denote the combination as Utility Preserving Magnitude 
(UPM) which is defined as follows: 
ܷܲܯሺݒǡ ݑሻ ൌ ͳൣܵܲܦ௩ǡ௨ ൅ ܰ ௩ܱǡ௨൧
ሺ͵ሻ 
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where ܵܲܦ is the Shortest Path Difference and ܱܰ is the Neighbourhood Overlap. We 
look at the higher value ofܷܲܯto represent higher utility preservation. This corresponds 
to smaller value of the sum of the value from ܵܲܦ and ܱܰmetrics. Using the Utility 
Preserving Magnitude (UPM), we can now quantify the topological impact in edge 
perturbation and greedily choose the option that offer small impact. 
 
Proposition 2: The Utility Preserving Magnitude (UPM) improves the preservation of 
graph structure integrity while achieving the privacy requirements. 
Proof. Let a set of ܲ ൌ ሺ݌ଵǡ ݌ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݌௡ሻ be the available options of edge perturbation in 
graph ܩ at a time. Suppose thatby choosing any of the options would transform the graph 
to k-anonymous. Hence choosing any perturbation option would achieve privacy 
condition. Since the application of UPM in the perturbation concerns with the distance 
and relative integrity between vertices inܩ, then the option ݌ that is chosen through UPM 
application ensures higher utility preservation than without the application  
 
The algorithm to calculate UPM is abstractly expressed as in Algorithm 6.1. 
Given network ܩ, the algorithm also take two vertices ݒଵ and ݒଶ as input for source and 
target vertex. These two vertices are among the vertex candidates on the list that are 
nominated for perturbation. The algorithm does not meant for deciding either edge 
deletion or addition because it only calculates the second shortest path between two given 
vertices at a time. The output value will then be used to decide which vertex pair has the 
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least impact from the perturbation. To measure the shortest path between ݒଵand ݒଶ, 
Djiksta algorithm could employed. In this case, the Djiksta algorithm is modified to 
perform forward and backward simultaneously in order to speed up the task.
 In Line 1 and Line 2, the algorithm first considers all the immediate neighbouring 
vertices of vertex ݒଵand ݒଶ. In edge deletion strategy, we would like to know the second 
shortest path in order to calculate the difference of the shortest path between ݒଵ and ݒଶ 
before and after edge deletion. Line 3 to Line 8 is the precaution step because two 
connected vertices is known to have shortest path length of 1. Removing the edge will 
Algorithm 6.1 Calculate Utility Preserving Magnitude (UPM) 
Input:ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻǡ ݒଵǡ ݒଶ 
Output:ܷܲܯ̴ݒ݈ܽݑ݁; 
1. ܽ ՚ ݁ሺݒଵǡ ݑሻǡ ݁ א ܧ; 
2. ܾ ՚ ݁ሺݒଶǡ ݑሻǡ ݁ א ܧ; 
3. IFݒଶ א ܽTHEN 
4.  ܽ െ ݒଶ; 
5. END 
6. IFݒଵ א ܾTHEN 
7.  ܾ െ ݒଵ; 
8. END 
9. ݌ܽݐ݄ ՚ ͳ; 
10. WHILE ࢇ ് ׎ and࢈ ് ׎ 
11. ܽ ՚ ݁ሺݒଵǡ ݑሻǡ ݁ א ܧ; 
12. ܾ ՚ ݁ሺݒଶǡ ݑሻǡ ݁ א ܧ; 
13.     IFݒଶ א ܽOR ݒଵ א ܾTHEN 
14. get݌ܽݐ݄. 
15. ELSE 
16.         update ݌ܽݐ݄; 
17.     END 
18. END 
19. ߙ ՚ ܽ ת ܾ; 
20. ߚ ՚ ܽ ׫ ܾǢ 
21. ݋ݒ݁ݎ݈ܽ݌ ՚ ఠାఈఠାఉ ; 
22. ܷܲܯ̴ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ൌ  ଵ௣௔௧௛ା௢௩௘௥௟௔௣ Ǣ 
23. returnܷܲܯ̴ݒ݈ܽݑ݁; 
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make the algorithm to find the next shortest path. In edge addition case, Line 4 and Line 
7 will not be invoked because bothݒଵ and ݒଶ are not yet connected.The algorithm 
proceeds to find shortest path length to calculate the difference after an edge was added. 
The shortest path after adding edge would be 1. Line 9 sets the first hop resulted from the 
step in Line 1 and 2. In Line 10 to 18, the algorithm proceeds with the next hops to find 
the target or source vertices in the neighbouring set of instances vertices. The iteration 
stops once the source vertex ݒଵ or ݒଶexists in the neighbouring set of the instance 
vertices. Line 19 to 21 calculates the neighbourhood overlap score between ݒଵ andݒଶ. 
This involves the direct neighbors of the vertices which already been assigned to ܽandܾ. 
Finally, the UPM value is calculated in Line 22. The algorithm returns the UPM value 
between ݒଵand ݒଶ.The application of UPM is shown in Algorithm 6.2. 
 
Algorithm 6.2 UPM based k-anonymization algorithm 
Input:ܩሺܸǡ ܧሻ,k. 
Output: k-anonymous graph ܩ෠ሺܸǡ ܧ෠ሻ 
8. ׋՚Cluster graph ܩሗ according to k-anonymity model ܪ. 
9. ܾ݇ ՚ ሺȁܿ௡ȁ א ׋൏ ݇). 
10. WHILE ȁܾ݇ȁ ് ׎DO 
11. IF edge should be added THEN 
12.         get vertex candidates to add new edge; 
13.         calculate Utility Preserving Magnitude for every candidates; 
14.         add edge to the vertex with highest UPM value; 
15. ELSE IF edge should be deleted THEN 
16.  get vertex candidates to delete existing edge; 
17.         calculate Utility Preserving Magnitude for every candidates; 
18.         delete edge with highest UPM value; 
19. END 
20.      update ܾ݇; 
21. END 
22. return ܩ෠. 
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 Algorithm 6.2 shows the anonymization algorithm. It also shows how the UPM 
calculation is employed in greedy iterative approach. The inputs are network ܩ and value 
݇ as anonymity requirement. After clustering the graph (Line 1), the algorithm lists the 
clusters that contain less than ݇ members (Line 2). Lines 3 to Line 14 are the steps to 
perturb social graph ܩ either by edge deletion or edge addition. To decide between edge 
addition and edge addition depends on the calculation of nearest graph. When the 
algorithm decides to merge two clusters in order to achieve ݇ members, the merging cost 
needs to be minimum in order to reflect nearest graph requirement as defined in 
DEFINITION 5. For example, assume anonymity requirement݇ ൌ ͷ, and ܾ݇ has two 
clusters that contain less than ݇ members namely cluster ܿ௜ and ௝ܿ. Meanwhile, cluster 
ȁܿ௜ȁ ൌ ʹ means it contains two members and cluster ห ௝ܿห ൌ ͵. Merging these two clusters 
together will satisfy݇. To merge these two clusters, there are two options; to move ܿ௜ to 
௝ܿ or the otherwise. Apparently, ܿ௜ contains less member than ௝ܿ which means moving ܿ௜ 
to ௝ܿ willneed less perturbation compared to the otherwise. Thus, we say ܿ௜ is the source 
cluster and ௝ܿ is the target cluster. To decide whether edge deletion or addition should 
take place, we look at the size of the component member in the source cluster. If the 
component size in the source cluster is larger than the component size in target cluster, 
then edge deletion is needed to merge. Otherwise, if the size of component member in the 
target cluster is larger than edge addition is needed. For example, the source cluster has 
two vertices with 5-degree and the vertices member in the target cluster has 3-degree, we 
need to delete two edges from every member in source cluster so that they join the other 
cluster with 3-degree. The output of Algorithm 2 will be the anonymized social graph ܩ෠. 
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We now provide an example of the application of the metric we just proposed. 
For the ease of demonstration, we employ degree-based k-anonymity model [41] to 
accommodate the situation. Therefore, we assume that the adversary knows the victim’s 
vertex degree as his/her structural background knowledge. Although this paper only 
focuses on degree-based anonymity, the proposed approach is general and it is applicable 
to other k-anonymity-based privacy preserving schemes on social networks. 
DEFINITION 9: Degree k-anonymous. The social network graph is degree k-
anonymous, if every distinct value of vertex degree appears at least ݇ times. 
TABLE 6.5 THE DEGREE DISTRIBUTION OFܩ. 
Degree Members Frequency 
1 {B, C} 2 
2 {E, H, I} 3 
3 {A, D, G, J} 4 
4 {F} 1 
 
Table 6.5 gives the clusters of vertices according to vertex degree based on the 
graph in Fig. 6.1. Assume that the targeted value of k is 2. It appears that the cardinality 
of vertex with four degree is 1 which is less than k. That is, vertex ‘F’ happens to be 
unique in terms of the number of social links it has. This could potentially disclose the 
real identity behind the vertex if an adversary makes a query using degree information. 
To eliminate the risk, the graph is perturbed before it is released so that every vertex is 
anonymized by their degree (or other k-anonymity model).  
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There are several ways of graph perturbation that includes edge perturbation 
(edge addition and deletion) and vertex perturbation (vertex deletion and addition). In this 
paper, we assume that no fake vertices are added and no vertices in the original graphs 
are deleted as well. Therefore, we only consider both edge perturbation strategies during 
anonymization so that the original entities are maintained in the published social network.  
EXAMPLE 1: Consider Fig. 6.2 and CASE 1 where one of the edges of vertex F needs 
to be deleted. The shortest path length between vertex F and all the connected is 1. Using 
the proposed SPD metric, if the edge ܧሺܨǡ ܦሻ (marked as 1) is deleted, thenܵܲܦሺܨǡ ܦሻ ൌ
͵. That is, the shortest path length is 1 and the second shortest path is 4. The remaining 
SPD score areܵܲܦሺܨǡܪሻ ൌ ʹ , ܵܲܦሺܨǡ ܫሻ ൌ ͳ andܵܲܦሺܨǡ ܬሻ ൌ ͳ. Hence, the smallest 
distance difference are edge 3 and 4.  
EXAMPLE 2: Consider Fig. 6.3 and CASE 2 for edge addition case. Suppose there are 
eight pairs of possible vertices to be connected by an edge; ܧሺܣǡ ܧሻǡ ܧሺܣǡܪሻǡ
ܧሺܣǡ ܫሻǡ ܧሺܦǡܪሻǡ ܧሺܦǡ ܫሻǡ ܧሺܩǡ ܫሻǡ ܧሺܬǡ ܧሻ andܧሺܬǡ ܪሻ. First, the shortest path lengths 
between all the relevant vertices are calculated. Eventually, that after an edge is added 
between two vertices, the shortest path length will become 1. Having this knowledge, the 
SPD is calculated without actually adding new edge. The vertex pair with the smallest 
SPD will be connected by an edge. The SPD score for all the options in Fig. 3 are 
ܵܲܦሺܣǡ ܧሻ ൌ ͳǡ ܵܲܦሺܣǡܪሻ ൌ ʹǡ ܵܲܦሺܣǡ ܫሻ ൌ ʹǡ ܵܲܦሺܦǡܪሻ ൌ ͳǡ ܵܲܦሺܦǡ ܫሻ ൌ
ͳǡ ܵܲܦሺܩǡ ܫሻͳǡ ܵܲܦሺܬǡ ܧሻ ൌ ͳǡ ܵܲܦሺܬǡ ܪሻ ൌ ͳ. 
 
116 
 
Notice that the ܵܲܦሺܨǡ ܫሻ andܵܲܦሺܨǡ ܬሻ are both equal to 1. We then calculate the 
Neighbourhood Overlap (NO) to further differentiate these two. The NO’s score for the 
edges are ܱܰሺܨǡ ܫሻ ൌ ͲǤʹͺ͸ and ܱܰሺܨǡ ܬሻ ൌ ͲǤʹͷͲwith߱ ൌ ͳ. We notice that if we 
delete edge 4 which isܧሺܨǡ ܫሻ, the path available from vertex F to vertex I would 
consequently through vertex J only. However, deleting edge 3 gives more alternative 
paths from vertex F to vertex J. This indicates that we need to look for the smaller value 
of ܱܰሺݒǡ ݑሻ in order to reduce the impact on the important edge.  
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Fig. 6.4 Output graph ܩ෠. 
 
TABLE 6.6 The degree distribution of ܩ෠. 
Degree Members Frequency 
1 {B, C} 2 
2 {E, H, I, J} 4 
3 {A, D, G, F} 4 
4 {׎} 0 
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Finally we combine the Shortest Path Difference score and the Neighborhood 
Overlap score as Utility Preserving Magnitude (UPM) as given in (2). The combined 
score for all options for edge deletion task is ܷܲܯሺܨǡ ܦሻ ൌ ͲǤ͵ʹͲǡ ܷܲܯሺܨǡܪሻ ൌ
ͲǤͶ͸͹ǡܷܲܯሺܨǡ ܫሻ ൌ ͲǤ͹͹ͺandܷܲܯሺܨǡ ܬሻ ൌ ͲǤͺͲͲ. Having this value, the edge 
ܧሺܨǡ ܬሻ is chosen for deletion task. Fig. 6.4 shows the output graph ܩ෠ after edge deletion 
task. The degree distribution of ܩ෠ is given at TABLE 6.6. The graph satisfies k-
anonymity requirement with ݇ ൌ ʹ. It’s also shown that deleting ܧሺܨǡ ܬሻ preserves more 
utility to the graph in terms of relative importance among the involved vertices. We omit 
the example application for edge addition due to space limitation. 
6.4 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, we report the empirical result that we conducted to evaluate the 
performance of our proposed approach. We compare our approach to the widely-used 
amount-of-change approach. We first evaluate the exposure rate of the dataset according 
to model ܪ that we use. Then we compare the effects on different perturbation strategies. 
We then compare the utility with the baseline model. 
6.4.1 Re-identification Risk of the Datasets 
Here we look into the disclosure rate of all four datasets. Since we employ k-
degree anonymization model for this experiment, we assume the adversary know the 
vertex degree as a priori knowledge. Therefore, we cluster the dataset according to vertex 
degree to see the risk of identity re-identification attack on the dataset. All vertices with 
similar degree are clustered into a same group. Fig. 6.5 shows the clusters with its 
equivalent frequency of all four datasets. 
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Fig. 6.5 The frequency of equivalent classes for all databases. 
The figure plots the frequency of equivalent members in every degree clusters. It 
is evident that in all datasets, the risk of being re-identified by degree background 
knowledge is high. For example, Polbook dataset (marked with red square) has degree 
distributions that range from two to twenty-five degrees. The highest frequent member is 
from the cluster of five degrees, that is ʹʹ equivalent members. However, almost ʹͲΨ of 
the actors in the dataset can be uniquely re-identified while more than ͵ͲΨ are possible 
to be re-identified with ͷͲΨ probability of accuracy. These are the clusters with very low 
frequency which is ͳ and ʹ respectively. Therefore, the graph needs to be modified in 
order to avoid the identified risk. In the remaining sections, we show how much utility 
distortion resulted from the modification of the graph in order to achieve k-anonymity. 
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6.4.2 Comparing Different Perturbation Strategy 
In this section, we evaluate the utility impact of the proposed method among the 
different perturbation strategies. For this evaluation, we use PolBook dataset only. Fig. 
6.6 compares the utility impacts from each of perturbation strategies. The strategies are 
edge addition, edge deletion and combined strategies. 
 
Fig. 6.6 The impact on different perturbation strategies. 
 
In the Average Path Length evaluation (left), it is shown that when the k 
requirement increases, the amount of distortion also increases. The straight line in the 
graph is the score of the original graph. It maintains straight line because no modification 
done on the graph.  However, the direction for other lines deviates further when the ݇-
requirement increases. It is found that edge deletion strategy will increase the average 
path length. This is because, when two vertices are connected, the shortest path length 
between them is always 1. When the connection is deleted, the path route also change 
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resulted in longer path to reach one another. In the opposite way, edge addition reduces 
the number of hops between two vertices to 1. Mixing the strategies provides balance 
impact on the measurement change.  However, there need a mechanism in deciding 
between edge deletion and edge addition. One of the possible keys to consider is the 
number of change offers from both options. In this evaluation, the option with less 
number of changes decides which strategies to be employed.  
For clustering coefficient, the trend is different. The underlying element of 
clustering coefficient is the number of three vertices that are all connected each other 
called closed triplet. Edge deletion strategy may spoils more on the triplet that already 
formed. Therefore, the score from edge deletion strategy distorted more than other 
strategies. On the other hand, the combine edge deletion and edge addition strategy may 
deform and form the triplets. Therefore, the triplet may be absence and replaced back 
again using this strategy. Thus, we could see the distortion trend of combined strategy 
resides between edge deletion and edge addition.  
 
Fig 6.7  The computation time of all perturbation strategies. 
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The computation time taken for all strategies is given in Fig. 6.7. It is shown that 
edge deletion strategy requires more times to perform. This is because in social network 
graph, the amount of edges is always higher than the number of vertices. While edge 
deletion strategy involves every edge that every vertex candidates have, edge addition 
strategy only calculates the metric on the smaller set vertex candidates in order to add an 
edge. Combined strategy is found to balance this trade off.  
Fig. 6.8 reports the effects in total number of edges changes between the original 
and the anonymized graph. There are four lines to represent each dataset. As expected, 
the total number of edge changes increased when the privacy requirement increase. 
However, each dataset have different amount of edge difference to satisfy similar 
anonymization requirement.  Polbook has the lowest number of change while the jazz 
database has the highest. The amount of degree difference depends on the distance 
between the equivalent class. That means the amount of edge perturbation to make a 
cluster achieve k has to be small in order to get lower edge difference.  In this particular 
experiment, this measure relies on the degree difference between clusters below than k. 
When perturbing, we combined those particular clusters to the nearest cluster according 
to the degree difference. Hence, the nearer the degree difference, the lesser edge need to 
be perturbed to achieve k members. In the next evaluation, we show how edge difference 
correlate with different network metrics. We show that having similar degree difference 
could still have different output on network properties measurements. 
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Fig. 6.8 Comparison on the change in total number of edge. 
 
6.4.3 Comparing Against the Baseline 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approach against the 
baseline with respect to the privacy requirement. Fig. 6.9 and 6.10 summarize our 
findings. The graphs demonstrate the performance of the proposed approach over the 
baseline method with respect to different k values where higher k represents higher 
privacy requirements. 
Fig. 6.9 compares the effects on Average Path Length metric while Fig. 6.10 
gives the comparison on Clustering Coefficient metric. Respectively, graph a), b), c) and 
d) are the effects on Polbook, Jazz, Scale-free and Random database. In all the figures, 
lines with circle dot corresponding to the baseline algorithms while lines with square dot 
represent the results of the proposed approach. The dashed line is the measurement output 
from the original graph. The trends of the circle and square dot lines represent how much 
the utility of the modified graph deviates from the utility of the original graph when the 
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graph satisfies k-anonymity requirement. The closer the line to the dashed line the better 
the utility preservation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.9 Comparison on the average path length metric 
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In general, the results clearly show that the utility distorts more when the privacy 
requirement increases. The proposed approach has shown improved utility preservation 
in most cases of different graph type and sizes. To calculate the improvement in 
percentage, we use the following formula:  
ሺȁߙ െ ܮȁ െ ȁߚ െ ܮȁሻ
ߙ ൈ ͳͲͲሺ͵ሻ 
whereߙ is the baseline value, ߚ is the enhanced method value and ܮ is the original value. 
For example, the average path length measurement for Polbook dataset when ݇ ൌ ͸ are 
original = 3.0494, baseline =2.6132 and upm = 2.7240. So we achieved 
ȁʹǤ͸ͳ͵ʹ െ ͵ǤͲͶͻͶȁ െ ȁʹǤ͹ʹͶͲ െ ͵ǤͲͶͻͶȁ ʹǤ͸ͳ͵ʹൗ ൈ ͳͲͲ ൌ ʹͷǤͶΨ improvement over 
the baseline approach in this particular measurement. While the improvement is 
significant on some dataset, it has shown very small effect on Random dataset. This is 
probably due to the random distribution of the edges in the network. Thus, edge 
perturbation would not have much impact on the structural properties. This shows that the 
random graph is more robust to the others. 
There are occurrences of the lines get cross over the line of the original graph 
utility. This is due to the edge addition and edge deletion strategy that used in the 
algorithm. Removing edges may increase the path lengths among vertices while adding 
edges may decrease them. When both edge addition and deletion are employed, the 
average path length may fall above or below the original average path length value. 
However, the most important thing is the properties of the anonymized graph are fairly 
close to the original graph properties. 
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Fig. 6.10 Comparison on the average clustering coefficient metric. 
We also compare the effects on clustering coefficients between the anonymized 
graphs the original graphs (shown in Fig. 6.10). Comparing with the performance in 
average path length measurement, the clustering coefficient measurement has shown 
different trends. While the preservation is high in Polbook dataset, the other three 
datasets show inconsistent trends. However, the measurement output of the random graph 
0.36
0.38
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
2 4 6 8 10
av
g.
 c
lu
st
er
in
g 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
k 
Original
Baseline
UPM
0.585
0.59
0.595
0.6
0.605
0.61
0.615
0.62
2 4 6 8 10
av
g.
 c
lu
st
er
in
g 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
k 
Original
Baseline
UPM
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
2 4 6 8 10
av
g.
 c
lu
st
er
in
g 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
k 
Original
Baseline
UPM
0.4970
0.4975
0.4980
0.4985
0.4990
0.4995
0.5000
0.5005
0.5010
0.5015
2 4 6 8 10
av
g.
 c
lu
st
er
in
g 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
k 
Original
Baseline
UPM
a) Polbook b) Jazz 
c) Scale-free d) Random 
126 
 
follow similar characteristic as in average path length measurement due to the robustness 
of the graph. The increments and decrements trends are observed, however there is no 
conclusive trend on how the clustering coefficients changes when the graph is perturbed. 
Intuitively, the clustering coefficient has high dependency on the low path length. The 
basis is that, since the clustering coefficient is the ratio of the closed triplet over the open 
triplet of a vertex, deleting or adding edge within the range could effects the 
measurement. However, choosing the shortest second path length is the key in the 
proposed approach. If the algorithm perturbs more edge on the range of 2-path length, it 
might ruins the closed triplet of the involved vertices. 
It is worth mentioning that the plot for the average betweeness measurement 
follow similar pattern to the average path length for the same networks. However, the 
scale is not similar and the pattern is not totally perfect. Therefore, we omit the graph of 
average betweeness measurement in this paper. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Properties distortion introduced by edge perturbation can significantly reduce the 
relative importance among actors in social graph. In this chapter, we studied the method 
to improve the preservation of certain structural properties in social network graph 
anonymization. We proposed a topological-based metric to be used for strategic 
perturbation in regards to reduce the utility change. We have demonstrated our technique 
using a spectrum of experimental evaluations on both synthetic and real world data and 
we have shown that they are effective and general. As this approach considers several 
conditions during perturbation, it is not suitable for the task where time factor is more 
critical than preserving utility of the data. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this chapter, we summarize and conclude the contributions and findings of the 
thesis. We then discuss about the future directions and other potential research problems 
ahead. 
7.1 Conclusion 
This thesis studies about preserving privacy in social network data publishing. 
Releasing social network data to third parties has prompted privacy concern. A privacy 
breach occurs when sensitive information about individuals is disclosed to adversaries. 
The identity disclosure may be considered as the key of privacy violation in social 
networks because it usually leads to further disclosure of content information as well as 
the information about relationship of individuals. ܭ-anonymity has been a very popular 
choice of mechanism for preserving individual privacy in tabular data. The problem that 
this thesis focuses is on the application of ݇-anonymity for preserving identity privacy in 
social graph publishing. 
In the first study in Chapter 4, we focused on vertex re-identification attack which 
is one of the most important issues in social network data privacy. This attack re-
128 
 
identifies target victim in the released dataset by manipulating certain information about 
the targeted victim. Based on literatures, most of the ݇-anonymity models for social 
graph anonymization assumes that an adversary only learn a specific structural 
information about the target victim alone. However, in practice, it is possible that the 
adversaries manipulate the structural knowledge of more than one source on top of the 
structural information about the victim. Thus, we highlight this by introducing 
neighbourhood-pair attack. This attack manipulates the neighbourhood property of two 
connected vertices in a network. We show that when a social graph is anonymized using 
existing ݇-anonymization approaches, the identity of individuals are still at risk of re-
identification using neighbourhood-pair properties. We compared the privacy violation 
from the proposed attack with degree attack [41] and neighbourhood attack [19, 42]. The 
results showed that the neighbourhood-pair attack has higher re-identification rate 
compared with the existing attacks. On top of that, the re-identification is still possible on 
degree-anonymized graph and neighbourhood-anonymized graph. Therefore, a new 
anonymization approach needs to be developed in order to protect a social graph from 
neighbourhood-pair attack that is also able to protect from degree and neighbourhood 
attack. 
In the second study in Chapter 5, we tackled the problem of protection against 
neighborhood-pair attacks. We proposed an algorithm that transforms a social graph into 
݇-komuniti anonymous social graph. The social graph is ݇-komuniti anonymous when 
there are at least ݇ pair of neighbourhood exists in the graph. The algorithm involves 
several steps starting from clustering vertices by their degree properties. Then it modifies 
the edge until every vertex in the cluster is equivalent to each other in terms of their 
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neighbourhood properties. To represent the neighbourhood property, we proposed 
neighbourhood coefficient and the formula was given in Chapter 4. Finally, the edge that 
inter-connects between clusters is modified so that there have either at least ݇ edges inter-
connects the clusters or no edge at all. We found that, in order to achieve ݇-komuniti 
anonymous social graph, high amount of edge perturbation need to be performed. This 
has affected more utility of the graph. Through the experiment, it is shown that the 
proposed algorithms can effectively protect a social graph from neighbourhood-pair 
attack but at the cost of more utility change.  
 In the third study in Chapter 6, we focused on preserving utility in social graph 
anonymization. To estimate utility loss, many existing works use the number of edges 
that are altered during the anonymization process (i.e. added/removed/switched of edges 
and vertices) and then using heuristics approach to control or minimizing the damage. 
However, the utility of social network data is mostly related to the structure of the 
connection network among vertices. Controlling the number of change only is 
insufficient to preserve the relative importance among vertices in social graph. We 
proposed a topological-based metric to be used for strategic perturbation in regards to 
reduce the utility change. We have demonstrated our technique using a spectrum of 
experimental evaluations on both synthetic and real world data and we have shown that 
they are effective and general. As this approach considers several conditions during 
perturbation, it is not suitable for the task where time factor is more critical than reserving 
utility of the data. 
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7.2 Future Works 
 This section highlights a number of future research directions in line with the 
problems studied in this thesis. There are still many aspects that this areas needs to 
improve. 
7.2.1 Simple graph vs. Rich graph 
 Most existing works are tested only using simple graph which is a graph without 
any attributes on the vertices and edges. This is not the case in a real world social 
network data publishing where the data may be more complicated with various types of 
information. The main challenge both on the conceptual and technical aspect because an 
adversary will have more room of opportunities to re-identify vertices using various type 
of combined information. 
7.2.2 Privacy vs. Scalability vs. Utility 
 Current belief assumes that privacy needs to be treated individually. This means 
that the privacy preserving method needs to ensure that the privacy of each vertex is 
guaranteed. However, this results in high requirement of computing resources especially 
when the number of vertices is very large. A new mechanism need to be devised in order 
to realize this challenge. On top of that, a metric to quantify the level of privacy also 
needs to be realized.  
 Utility usually viewed in aggregate manner in which certain elements is combined 
to gives certain values in the analysis. An anonymization method that focuses on 
preserving certain aspect of utility is needed. This is true because when specific 
application of social graph is unknown, the measure of utility loss may not be practical.   
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